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ABSTRACT
Social bots represent a new generation of bots that make use of online social networks (OSNs) as a command
and control (C&C) channel. Malicious social bots were responsible for launching large-scale spam campaigns,
promoting low-cap stocks, manipulating user’s digital influence and conducting political astroturf. This paper
presents a detailed review on current social bots and proper techniques that can be used to fly under the radar
of OSN defences to be undetectable for long periods of time. We also suggest a refined taxonomy of detection
approaches from social network perspective, as well as commonly used datasets and their corresponding
findings. Our study can help OSN administrators and researchers understand the destructive potential of
malicious social bots and can improve the current defence strategies against them.
1 Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) are popular platforms that connect users all over the globe. A botnet represents a group of agents
(bots) that are managed and programmed to act in an organized manner. The term social botnet indicates a new generation botnet
that utilizes OSNs as a command and control (C&C) channel with minimal noise Burghouwt et al. (2013). A social botnet can be
used for mis- and dis-information campaigns without being detected as pieces of software Bruns and Stieglitz (2014a,b). Social
bots can also be used for benign purposes. For instance, on Wikipedia about 15% of all edits are made by bots Steiner (2014).
Even benign types of social bots can sometimes be harmful, for instance when they spread unverified information. This can be
seen as a result to the lack of fast-checking in most automatic trading systems Ferrara et al. (2016).
In 2010, Nappa et al. designed a botnet using Skype protocol, which includes a fault-tolerant, encrypted communication.
Moreover, it is firewall- and NAT-agnostic, which means that it does not require any additional network configuration. Koobface
is another example of a malware that has proved successful in propagating through different social networks. The OSN
propagation components of Koobface included several binaries, each of which has been developed to handle a particular OSN
Baltazar et al. (2009). Nazbot Kartaltepe et al. (2010), named after Jose Nazario, is also an earlier social bot that uses Twitter
as its C&C channel. It uses an account named upd4t3 owned by the botmaster on Twitter to receive commands, which were
encoded by base-64. Nazbot mainly employed Twitter’s Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feed to receive botmaster’s commands.
However, Twitter does not provide RSS services anymore, and also tweets encoded with base-64 can be easily decoded He et al.
(2017).
In August of 2014, Twitter has reported that approximately 8.5% of its users are bots, Subrahmanian et al. (2016). Moreover,
Zhang and Paxson (2011) showed that 16% of these bots exhibit highly automated behavior. Recently, Cresci et al. (2018b)
conducted a large-scale analysis of spam and bot activity in stock microblogs on Twitter. Their study showed that 71% of
retweeting users were classified as bots, 37% of which were suspended by Twitter.
Messias et al. (2013) showed that Klout and Kred scores can be manipulated using simple automatic strategies. Data mining
techniques can also be used to gain visibility and influence Bakshy et al. (2011) Lee et al. (2014) Suh et al. (2010) Pramanik
et al. (2015). Zhang et al. (2016b) showed that social bots can increase their the Kred and Retweet Rank influence scores of by
purposely following each other. They also showed that Klout, Kred, and Retweet Rank increases as the number that a user is
retweeted increases. In order to manipulate a targeted user’s influence score, social bots can either retweet a single tweet of
the target user to make this tweet very popular or retweet many of target user tweets so that each tweet will be less popular.
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Bot-As-A-Service (BaaS) presents an emerging trend to provide a specific automated behavior on behalf of the user for a monthly
price Bessi and Ferrara (2016). Such a service can be used to increase bot’s influence score and to attract other legitimate users
based on specific hashtags.
A 4-week competition was conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in February and March
2015, where the challenge was to identify influence bots on Twitter Subrahmanian et al. (2016). Competitors had to: (1) separate
influence bots from other types of bots, (2) separate influence bots about topic t from those about other topics and (3) separate
influence bots about topic t that sought to spread sentiments s from those that were either neutral or that spread on opposite
sentiment. Six teams (University of Southern California, Indiana University, Georgia Tech, Sentimetrix, IBM, and Boston
Fusion), competed to discover 39 influence bots. The teams had no information about the number of bots included in the
competition. DARPA botnet challenge suggested that a bot-detection system needs to be semi-supervised. That is, human
judgments are required to improve detection of these bots. Visualization methods are also necessary to assets the experts to take
better decisions about suspicious bots Subrahmanian et al. (2016).
In Table 1, we present a brief summary of existing real-world and research-based social bots. From this table, one can observe
how the creators of social bot make use of additional techniques to conduct successful malicious activities at both user-side and
OSN-side. This may include further efforts at different stages of bot’s life cycle. For instance, automatic CAPTCHA solver can
be used to create fake (sybil) accounts. Encryption techniques can be used in order to protect the confidentiality of the exchanged
messages between the bot master and social bots from OSN’s security defence. One can also observe that a great deal of recent
research has focused on introducing advanced social bots through experiments or simulations, whereas few of them have been
implemented in real network scenarios.
Table 1: A brief summary of existing social bots
Ref. Name
R
E
S
Encoded
Encrypted, or
Authenticated
Remarks
Baltazar et al. (2009) Koobface R
Bitwise-ADD
& bitwise-OR
operations
The propagation of zombies occurs as obfuscated URLs or
by using re-directors.
Kartaltepe et al.
(2010)
Nazbot R base-64encoded text.
Uses RSS to receive encrypted tweets from the botmaster
account on Twitter.
Xiang et al. (2011) Andbot S Base64 enc. &public key enc.
Uses URL Flux and avoids DNS sinkhole, malicious, commands
injection, IP blacklist and C&C server shutdown attacks.
Lu et al. (2011) AHP2P Botnet 2.0 S Message-Digest (MD5)
Consist of servant bots and client bots, which attack
target after they receive malware information from servant bot.
Nagaraja et al. (2011) Stegobot S Imagesteganography It can only be detected using ad-hoc entropy measures
Faghani and Nguyen
(2012)
Socellbot S No Simulated on OSN graph and it infected smartphones.It is easily noticeable due to the generation of suspicious traffic.
Elishar et al. (2012) Organizational So-
cialbot
R No
Automatically sends friend requests in order to befriend
with employees working in the targeted organization.
They used Markov clustering and closeness centrality
measure to cluster and to uncover leadership roles.
Elyashar et al. (2013)
Sophisticated
Organizational
Socialbots
R No
For each organization, they created a social-bot account
that mimics legitimate users’ behaviour and becomes friend
with specific users in the targeted organizations. They were
able to gain a successful infiltration with 50-70%.
Singh et al. (2013) Twitterbot R No It performs malicious attacks like browsing webpage,DoS attack, emailing files or gathering system information
Burghouwt et al.
(2013)
Twebot R SSLv1 A variant of Nazbot, which polls a Twitter accountevery 20 seconds
Boshmaf et al.
(2013a)
Yazanbot R No
It includes an additional social bot-OSN channel and exploits
triadic closure principle. It also uses HTTP-request
templates to conduct unsupported (illegal) API calls.
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Ref. Name
R
E
S
Encoded
Encrypted, or
Authenticated
Remarks
Cao and Qiu (2013) Asp2p S
Public key
encryption &
authentication
It includes enhancements over AHP2P 2.0 due to the key
exchange communication schema.
Zhang et al. (2013)
spam distribution
and influence
manipulation
S
-
R
No
They studied botnet-based spam distribution as an
optimization problem. Also the influence manipulation
was confirmed by real experiments.
Yin et al. (2014) Dr-snbot R AES & RSA The generation of network traffic makes it detectablewith correlation and behavioural analysis.
Sebastian et al.
(2014)
Graybot E DiffieHellman
Attacks launched includes conversion of files
to shortcut, executables or keylogger.
Paradise et al. (2014) Targeted social-
bots
S No
The most connected and page rank strategies were the most
favorable for the defender. Whereas the most effective
attack was randomly sprayed friend requests when the
attacker knows the defense strategy.
Compagno et al.
(2015)
Boten ELISA E
Unicode
steganography,
AES, RSA
with SHA-2
C&C messages are piggybacked on the honest content of the
victim posts on the OSN. It does not generate new
traffic, which makes it unnoticeable by an infected user.
Pantic and Husain
(2015)
Secret C& C S Encodingmap
Stegno system that allows secret communication
using only meta-data of the tweet.
Abokhodair et al.
(2015)
SyrianBot R N.A
Used mis-direction and smoke screening to influence
users’ attention. It also included a peculiar hashtag,
which is a combination of three random letters.
He et al. (2016)
WTAR-based
bots (Wbbot,
Fbbot,Twbot)
R
Data
Encryption
Standard
(DES)
Used web test automation rootkit (WTAR)
technique to carry out host and OSN activities.
Makkar et al. (2017) Sociobot E Encoded
Used Docker to simulate users. Each bot is a java
application that makes use of Twitter API. Epidemic
models were used to validate and analyze the botnet.
Echeverria and Zhou
(2017a)
Bursty R N.A Included automatic CAPTCHA solver.It cannot be detected by supervised learning.
Echeverria and Zhou
(2017b)
Star Wars Bots R N.A Tweets only from Windows Phone sources and shows distincttextual features. Therefore, it can be easily detected.
Wu et al. (2018) SLBot R
Base64 en.
public key
encryption
Used steganographic techniques to hide command
addresses in multimedia resources on OSNs.
Cresci et al. (2018b) CashtagPiggybacking R N.A
Promotes low-value stocks by exploiting
the popularity of high-value ones.
R: Real-world social bot, E: Experiment-based social bot, S: simulation-based social bot.
Previous research efforts were focused on coarse-grained taxonomy Ramalingam and Chinnaiah (2018); Kumar and Shah
(2018); Kayes and Iamnitchi (2017); Kaur and Singh (2016); Heydari et al. (2015). However, in this work we provide more
fine-grained taxonomy that leads to a better understanding of the state-of-the-art in social bot detection. In the next sections, we
discuss different aspects to cover most essential aspects of the topic under consideration in order to see the big picture and to
increase the awareness of OSNs’ administrators, research community and the users who are susceptible to these attacks. This
includes discussing different stealthy behaviours and techniques used by advanced social bots (Section 2). We also try to provide
more detailed profiling of social bots in order to distinguish among different types at different levels (Section 3). Furthermore,
we suggest a refined taxonomy of social-network based detection approaches (Section 4), as well as datasets used, and the
corresponding findings in detail (Section 5). A brief summary of this paper is shown in Fig. 1.
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2 Stealthy Social Bots
In OSN settings, there is no communication between bots that do not exchange information with each other, therefore social bots
do not add any connection end-points to communicate between themselves. Moreover, there is no additional communication
beyond what that bot or other legitimate users already exchange, which results in a very stealthy design in compared with
traditional bots Nagaraja et al. (2011).
Cresci et al. (2017) highlighted the difficulties in distinguishing and taking an appropriate action against new generations of spam
bots, which mimic the behavior of genuine users. Every bot had a profile filled in with detailed, yet fake, personal and other
meta-data information. For instance, Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing can be used to manipulate their geographical
location. This type of bots were employed to support some candidates in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election Bessi and Ferrara
(2016).
Furthermore, social bots can search the Web to find some useful information that may be used fill their profiles, and post these
collected material at particular time periods, to imitate the users’ temporal signature of producing and consuming information
Ferrara et al. (2016). These bots were spotted during the last Mayoral election in Rome in 2014. A second group of social bots
was used to promote a mobile phone application, called Talnts, to get in touch with professional talents in their location. A third
group was used to advertise online products using spamming URLs. A human-to-spambot interaction was found in the first and
third group. In other words, they found a set of legitimate users that interacts with these spam bots.
As the research community develops more advanced bot detection techniques, social bots also tend to be more sophisticated and
find their way to evade detection. Therefore, from the botmaster’s perspective, new techniques are also being developed to evade
the current OSN’s defences using more stealthy, malicious yet cautious social bots that “act like human and think like a bot"
Ferrara et al. (2016). This fact shows that the developers of social bots follow the recent advances in defence techniques and
figure out how to they can exploit them in their future bots. In the next subsections we discuss different techniques that have
been used to develop very advanced stealthy bots.
2.1 Malicious, yet cautious, use of OSN’s API
Bots constantly check OSN’s API restrictions to guarantee that they would not be identified as bots and blocked. For instance
Twitter’s API restrictions include: (i) maximum number of requests per hour is 350; (ii) each user can follow up to 2,000 users;
(iii) a user cannot follow more than 1,000 users per day. Twitter’s Sample API, is a popular tool among researchers that returns a
random sample of all public tweets generated on Twitter (1%). Basically, Sample API selects tweets based on their timestamp.
More precisely, any tweet whose ID is generated in the millisecond range of [657, 666] will be selected by the Sample API
Kergl et al. (2014). This mechanism assumes that the millisecond-level information of the ID’s timestamp is random since
humans don’t have any fine-grained control over the tweet’s time-stamp. However, social bots have the ability to achieve such
fine-grained control that allows them to predict the time that Twitter receives their tweets and ultimately increase their chance to
appear in the sample.
Morstatter et al. (2016a) confirmed the existence of strong linear relationship between the time the tweet is sent and the
millisecond ID of the tweet ID. Accordingly, they designed an algorithm that adaptively measures the network lag between when
the tweet is sent and when the tweet is received by Twitter, measured by the ID of the tweet. Moreover, Yazanbot Boshmaf et al.
Stealthy Social Bots Social Bot Profiling
A Refined Taxonomy of 
Detection Approaches
Datasets and 
Findings
In this section, we review the 
techniques used in advanced 
stealthy social bots
In this section, we discuss 
social bot profiling which 
can be seen as fine-grained 
classification of social bots.
In this section, we discuss 
social botnet detection 
approaches based on a 
novel refined taxonomy.
In this section, we 
provide a comparison 
of used datasets and 
related findings.
Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5
Figure 1: A brief summary of our study.
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(2013a) used HTTP-request templates to conduct an unsupported API call by recording the exact HTTP requests that are used to
carry out such a call. Moreover, a friend injection attack Huber et al. (2010) allows a stealth infiltration of OSNs by tapping
network traffic to extract authentication cookies and to submit requests on behalf of the legitimate user.
2.2 Mimicking the behaviour of legitimate users
Gürsun et al. (2018) introduced the concept of context-aware attacks, in which the attacker can mimic the behavior of legitimate
user’s traffic to be undetected for long periods of time. In OSN settings, a social bot can mimic a legitimate user’s behavior,
network structure or interest to appear as a legitimate user. For instance, Lee et al. (2011b) observed that social bots post on
average only four tweets per day to appear as legitimate and ultimately evade detection by OSNs defences. Another interesting
example from the Syrian social botnet showed that a bot-based opinion tweet, which mimics human interest, was retweeted
by 237 human accounts Abokhodair et al. (2015). Moreover, social bots can search for the most influential people and send
them spam messages based on their topic/event/keywords of interest to be more publicized. They can take advantage of recent
advances of natural language algorithms to be effectively involved in popular discussions to gain legitimate users’ attention
Ferrara et al. (2016), and ultimately appear more legitimate than simple social bots.
2.3 Inferring hidden information of legitimate users and organizations
Social bots can infer information that is not explicitly mentioned or allowed to be accessed by other users in order to increase the
likelihood of a successful infiltration Hwang et al. (2012). A social bot can be used for exposing private information (i.e. phone
numbers and addresses) after a successful infiltration. A social bot can also interacts with a legitimate user’s friends, which
allows it to produce a coherent content with similar temporal patterns Ferrara et al. (2016). Moreover, a social bot may take the
advantage of machine learning approaches to infer hidden attributes from public insensitive attributes in social networks. For
instance, inferring age information based on available public user profiles Zhang et al. (2016a) and interaction information Mei
et al. (2017).
Furthermore, Fire and Puzis (2016) introduced algorithms that can be used for constructing organizational crawlers, which collect
data from Facebook network in order to gather public information on users who worked in a specific organization based on
informal social relationships among employees of targeted organizations. By applying centrality analysis and machine learning
techniques, they were able to restructure parts of the targeted organization and to discover hidden departments and leadership
roles, among the many discoveries, in each organization.
Moreover, guided crawlers provide a proper balance between exploration and exploitation, which can be leveraged by social
bots in order to target a certain organization Bnaya et al. (2013a,b). Such tools allow them to intelligently select organizational
member profiles and monitor their activity to infringe the privacy of the targeted organization in general and the corresponding
users in particular. As a result, the collected information can be used to falsely convince the targeted users that these crafted bots
are more likely to be legitimate users rather than malicious accounts.
2.4 Breaking automated-behavior detection techniques
Koobface sends the CAPTCHA requests to other computers that are part of the botnet and waits for one of the humans at those
other computers to enter the CAPTCHA information for it. If the account is locked down, Koobface can automatically verify the
account and reactivate it. Koobface makes money by fraudulently driving traffic through a combination of mainstream affiliate
advertising networks and criminal networks Tanner et al. (2010).
Crowdsourcing can be used to break CAPTCHA as Motoyama et al. (2010) showed that companies charge $1 per 1000
succesfully solved CAPTCHAs, and this process is automated using software APIs for uploading CAPTCHAs and receiving
results. Overall, the service providers were reasonably accurate (86–89%).
Ye et al. (2018) showed that they can break text-based CAPTCHAs using generative adversarial network (GAN). They evaluated
their approach by applying it to 33 CAPTCHA schemes, including 11 schemes that are currently being used by 32 of the top-50
popular websites including Microsoft, Wikipedia, eBay and Google. This approach is highly efficient as it can solve a CAPTCHA
within 0.05 second using a desktop GPU Ye et al. (2018).
Furthermore, Bock et al. (2017) defeated Google’s audio reCaptcha defence with over 85% accuracy using multiple speech
recognition tools. Aiken and Kim (2018) presented DeepCRACk, a deep learning model based on bidirectional recurrent neural
network (BRNN) to automatically break audio CAPTCHAs with an accuracy of 98.8%. The model was trained on 100,000
audio samples generated using SimpleCaptcha (an open-source CAPTCHA system) and showed the ability to break audio audio
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CAPTCHA in 1.25 seconds on average. Sivakorn et al. (2016b), on the other hand, investigated the role of Google’s tracking
cookies, which are used in the CAPTCHA’s defenses. They have noticed that CAPTCHA system was aware of user’s interacts
with Google services. They were able to fool the system after just 9 days of automated browsing across different Google services.
Sivakorn et al. (2016a) used deep convolutional neural networks to break Google’s and Facebook’s image-based CAPTCHAs.
Their system achieved an accuracy of 70.78% when applied to Google’s reCaptcha challenges, while requiring only 19 seconds
per challenge. It also showed an accuracy of 83.5% when applied to Facebook’s image CAPTCHAs. Overall, one can observe
that text-, image- and even audio-based CAPTCHAs were all breakable using low-cost techniques, and therefore they can
potentially be used by next generation social bots.
2.5 Deceptive techniques for their malicious activity
In practice, OSN’s security defences may detect and therefore take down accounts associated with malicious activities. To solve
this issue, social bots can find more deceptive techniques to maintain their malicious activities. For instance, Flashback a trojan
targeting Mac OS X, instead of searching for Tweets from a specific user, it generates a hashtag, which is used to search for any
tweet containing that particular hashtag. In this way, there is no single user account for Twitter to take down Prince (2012) Lehtio
(2015). Spam bots also may include legitimate URLs in their posts to avoid detection. This phenomenon is called legitimate
URL inclusion attack Tan et al. (2013).
Moreover, Cresci et al. (2019) developed a new model that produces variants of malicious bots, which need to satisfy a given
criteria (i.e. evading detection) based on genetic algorithm approach. Online user behaviors were modeled (encoded) with
DNA-inspired strings of characters representing the sequence of a user’s online actions. At each new generation a subset of the
synthetic accounts is replaced with other synthetic accounts that are proven to be more similar to legitimate user accounts. The
synthetic accounts generated were evaluated against a state- of-the-art detection technique and were able to evade detection.
Apart from that, bots may choose to conduct their malicious activities during the night rather during the day to avoid reporting by
other OSNs users.
2.6 Deceptive social features
Social bots can send a mixture of both malicious and legitimate messages. Hence in many cases they share the same sender
and will naturally have exactly the same value of the sender’s social degree. This attack can be even more successful when
the attacker uses a compromised account Gao et al. (2012). Social bots can also follow each other and retweet/answer others’
tweets. By maintaining a balanced following/followers ratio, individual bots can escape early detection in OSN platforms Zhang
et al. (2016b). Moreover, Yazanbot Boshmaf et al. (2013a) exploited triadic closure principle Rapoport (1953), to increase the
magnitude of the potential infiltration. They even showed that attackers can estimate the probability of a certain user to accept a
friend request, given the total number of friends the user have and the number of mutual friends with the social bot Boshmaf et al.
(2011, 2013a); Paradise et al. (2014). Therefore, in order to maximize the infiltration, sophisticated bots can choose a certain
group of users with probability of accepting friend requests coming from social bots Paradise et al. (2014).
Furthermore, Hwang et al. (2012) observed that the more friends a user has, the less selective he/she will be when filtering out
social bot-based friendship requests. Wagner et al. (2012) investigated the susceptibility of users who are under social bots attack.
Their analysis interestingly showed that the attacks of social bots can be successful even when users are highly active and already
have gained experience with social networks.
Apart from that, Alvisi et al. (2013) empirically showed that well-known structural properties (i.e. popularity distribution
among graph nodes, small world property and clustering coefficient) are not able to provide full-proof defence against sybil
attacks. However, the conductance seems much interesting from OSN defence perspective as it takes much more effort to appear
legitimate under strong attacks. The attacker enlarges every cut with some probability p, which increases the cut with minimum
conductance, and ultimately the conductance of the whole network.
2.7 Sophisticated propagation of social bots
As some OSNs such as Twitter, according its previous rules, suspends only the users that originate spam tweets without taking
any action against those retweeting them. This idea motivated Zhang et al. (2016b) to represent spam distribution as a retweeting
tree in which only the root originate spam tweets. Accordingly, all the social bots except the root can avoid detection by OSN
defence. They also suggested a multi-objective optimization to minimize the delay to reach a maximum number of legitimate
users at the minimum cost of spam distribution.
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Faghani and Nguyen (2018) constructed a botnet propagation tree (BPT) from an OSN graph, after recruiting all the potential
vulnerable nodes and removing the users that are not infected. The user can be infected as early as possible via the shortest
path from the infiltrating node. They also studied various strategies that can be used to maximize the number of bots while
minimizing the risk of being detected.
2.8 Different methods to receive commands from the botmaster
Malicious commands from the botmaster can be sent via unicast or broadcast messages. In the former case, the botmaster
chooses the recipients of the commands from a list of bots. In the latter case, however, the recipients have to join one of different
groups created by the botmaster, which sends only one message to several users in order to avoid or delay detection Faghani and
Nguyen (2018). Nagaraja et al. (2011) used image steganography scheme over the Facebook social network to hide malicious
information. Each bot gathers the information requested by the botmaster such as files matching search strings then encodes
them as much as possible in a single image according to a detection threshold. In order to increase the robustness of their botnet,
Wu et al. (2018) suggested that bots should receive the addresses of stored commands from an addressing channel, which can be
any OSN that allows custom URLs and provides temporary storage where the address is Base64-encoded and signed by private
key schema and hidden in a picture.
3 Social Bot Profiling
Many studies in the literature have focused merely on distinguishing legitimate users and malicious social bots Wang (2010);
Dickerson et al. (2014); Dorri et al. (2018); Ji et al. (2016); Ferrara (2018); Besel et al. (2018). Other studies, however, suggested
more fine-grained classification at different levels. For instance Kartaltepe et al. (2010), in their client-side countermeasure,
collected process-level information to distinguish benign and suspicious processes.
In social graph-based defence approaches bots are often referred to as sybils (fake accounts) that are mainly used to forge other
users’ identities and launch malicious activities Ferrara et al. (2016). Cao and Yang (2013) refereed to the sybils adjacent to the
attack edges as entrance sybils and the other sybils as latent sybils.
Furthermore, social bots can also be categorized into different fine-grained classes. Chu et al. (2012) defined a bot as an
automated account used for spam purposes, whereas a cyborg represents a bot-assisted human or human-assisted bot. Tavares
and Faisal (2013) categorized Twitter accounts into three groups: (1) personal, (2) managed and (3) bot-controlled accounts
based on their tweet time intervals. Even though they may involve in a malicious activity, all real users’ accounts (such as human
spammers, trolls, managed accounts) are not social bots. Stringhini et al. (2010) also focused on different types of spam bots
(Displayer, bragger, poster and whisperer). Clark et al. (2016) focused on three distinct classes of automated tweeting: robots,
cyborgs and human spammers. El-Mawass et al. (2018) studied verified users (cyborgs), human users, trends hijackers and
promotional spam bots.
Lee et al. (2011b) suggested various categories of content polluters (Duplicate spammer, Duplicate @ spammer, malicious
promoter and friends infiltrator). Duplicate spammers post nearly identical tweets with or without links. Duplicate @ Spammers
they are similar to Duplicate spammers however they also abuse Twitter’s @username mechanism by randomly inserting a
legitimate user’s @username. Malicious promoters include legitimate and more sophisticated tweeting about online business,
marketing or finance. Friend infiltrators adopt “act legitimate and think malicious" approach by abusing the reciprocity in
following relationships.
Grier et al. (2010) studied both carrier spammers and compromised accounts. Abokhodair et al. (2015) classified each bot into
one of five categories (short-lived bots, long-lived bots, generator bots, core bots and peripheral bots) based on distinct behavioral
patterns. Song et al. (2015) analyzed retweets generated by three account groups: (1) normal, (2) crowdturfing, and (3) bots
from black market sites. Benigni et al. (2019) distinguished between promoted accounts and community influencers. Fernquist
et al. (2018) used the term bot to refer to accounts that show an automated behaviour, including automated social bots and sock
puppets.
Echeverría et al. (2018) focused on multiple bot types, which were obtained from a variety of social bot datasets. Their aggregated
bot dataset contained over 1.5 million bots with all their available tweets. Yan (2013) investigated different types of social
botnets namely standalone, appendix and crossover botnets. Standalone botnets are isolated from the normal online social
network. Appendix botnets have only one direction following relationships. Crossover botnets have following relationships
in both directions between bots and normal users. Beg˘enilmis¸ and Uskudarli (2018) distinguished between (organized- vs.
organic-behavior), (pro-Trump vs. pro-Hillary vs none) and (political vs. nonpolitical). Gao et al. (2010) focused on detecting
malicious (URL/posts).
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Gao et al. (2012) distinguished between spam and legitimate clusters. Lee et al. (2011a) used graph mining to detect top largest
campaigns (spam, promotion, template, news, and celebrity campaigns). Furthermore, honey-profiles can be used to capture
behavioural patterns of social bots. For instance Stringhini et al. (2010) in their honey-profile-based approach were able to
identify two kinds of bot behaviors namely: stealthy and greedy bots. Greedy bots add a spam content in every message they
send, whereas stealthy bots send messages that look legitimate, and inject them only once in a while Stringhini et al. (2010). On
the other hand, Freitas et al. (2015) suggested a reverse-engineering approach to understand different infiltration strategies of
malicious social bots in Twitter.
Apart from these categories which mainly deal with malicious bot, Oentaryo et al. (2016) provided a new categorization that
includes both benign and malicious bots. This behavior-based categorization included three main types namely broadcast,
consumption and spam bots. A broadcast bot is managed by a particular organization or a group and mainly used for information
dissemination purposes. Consumption bot also aims at aggregating contents from different sources and provides update services.
Spam bot, on the other hand, is used for delivering malicious contents.
As we have discussed above, social bot profiling is an essential step for many reasons: (1) detection approaches may focus on
certain types of benign or malicious social bots while miss other types, (2) OSN administrators need to allow benign bots while
mitigate the malicious ones and (3) other benign accounts such as cyborgs and managed accounts can be falsely detected as
malicious bots, which yields undesirable high false-negative rates.
4 Detection of Social Bots
In this section, we focus on social network-based detection of malicious bots where the detection approaches fall into three main
categories as shown in Fig. 2. Previous research efforts were focused on coarse grained taxonomy Ramalingam and Chinnaiah
(2018); Kumar and Shah (2018); Kayes and Iamnitchi (2017); Kaur and Singh (2016); Heydari et al. (2015). However, this work
provides a refined taxonomy that leads to a better understanding of the state-of-the-art in social bot detection. We also investigate
the strength and weakness of these approaches, along with their effectiveness and weaknesses in real-world OSNs.
4.1 Graph-based approaches
As we mentioned previously, in social graph-based defence approaches bots are often referred to as sybils (fake accounts), which
are mainly used to forge other users’ identities and launch malicious activities Ferrara et al. (2016). Graph-based approaches are
based on three key assumptions. First, the cut between the sybil and honest regions is sparse. Second, the benign region is fast
mixing, which implies that random walks of steps will end in a random edge in the honest region with high probability. Third,
the social edges represent strong trust relationships, and therefore it is hard for the attacker to create links to the legitimate users
(i.e. to the honest region) Alvisi et al. (2013); Gao et al. (2018). Based on these three assumptions graph-based approaches can
be categorized into the following groups:
4.1.1 Strong assumption-based approaches
4.1.1.1 Random-walk-based approaches SybilGuard Yu et al. (2006) performs long random walks Θ(
√
n log n) that should
intersect with the suspect node in order to accept it as honest. SybilGuard makes use of the following observations, which hold
only when the number of attack edges is limited: (i) the average honest node’s random route is highly likely to stay within the
honest region and (ii) two random routes from honest nodes are highly likely to intersect within the random walk.
SybilLimit Yu et al. (2008), on the other hand, uses multiple instances (
√
m) of short random walks O(log n) to sample nodes
from the honest set and accepts a node as honest when there is an intersection among the last edge of the random routes of the
verifier and the suspect, and the intersection satisfies a balance constraint. It is obvious that SybilGuard performs intersections
on nodes, whereas SybilLimit applies intersections on edges. Both SybilGuard and SybilLimit are high vulnerable when high
degree nodes are compromised. Therefore, one can conclude that these two approaches are more effective in defending against
malicious users than defending against compromised honest users. They also include a pre-processing step in which nodes with
degrees smaller than a pre-defined threshold were removed from theses approaches. As a result, a large number of nodes will be
pruned Mohaisen et al. (2010) due to the fact that social networks often have a long-tail degree distribution Clauset et al. (2009);
Gong et al. (2012). Moreover, it can result in high false positive/negative rates according to how the OSN operator treats these
pruned nodes Gao et al. (2015).
Fast mixing with the honest region implies the absence of small cuts whereas the slow mixing between honest and dishonest
implies that one can compute the bottleneck cut between honest and sybil nodes to infer the labels of each node Danezis and
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Figure 2: A refined taxonomy of social bot detection approaches.
Mittal (2009). SybilInfer considers the disturbance in fast-mixing between the honest and dishonest region as a faint bias in the
last node of a short random walk. Unlike SybilGuard and SybilLimit, SybilInfer depends primarily on the number of colluding
malicious nodes, not on the number of attack edges and it also performs independently of the topology of the sybil region
Danezis and Mittal (2009).
SybilResist Ma et al. (2014) consists of four main parts and four stages: (1) performing random walks O(log n) starting from a
known node. Then, selects the nodes with a frequency higher than a pre-defined threshold. These nodes are treated as honest
nodes (2) sybil identification to identify the suspect nodes based on comparing with the mean and standard deviation of the
previous random walks; (3) walk length estimation to set the initial value for Sybil region detection algorithms and (4) detecting
the Sybil region among the detected nodes. The main drawback here is that every time the structure of the sybil region changes,
the performance changes according to the length of random walks used in each step. Furthermore, SybilResist is also high
vulnerable when high degree nodes are compromised.
SybilRank Cao et al. (2012), uses short random walks to distribute initial scores from a set of trusted benign seeds. It consists
of three steps: 1) trust propagation, 2) trust normalization, and 3) ranking. In the first stage, SybilRank propagates trust from
the trust seeds via O(log |V |) power iterations. The second stage includes normalization of the total trust of every node with
its social degree. In the last stage, SybilRank generates a ranked list based on the degree-normalized trust with non-sybil
users on top. SybilRank exploits the mixing time difference between the non-Sybil region and the entire graph to distinguish
sybil from non-sybils. However, it requires that the sybil region have a longer mixing time than the non-sybil region where
the early-terminated power iteration result in a gap between the degree-normalized trust of non-sybils and sybils. SybilRank
makes use of the paradigm of innocent by association, in which an account interacting with a legitimate user is considered
itself legitimate. This approach relies on the assumption that legitimate users refuse to interact with unknown accounts, which
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was proven to be unrealistic by recent experiments Stringhini et al. (2010); Boshmaf et al. (2013b); Elyashar et al. (2013), and
therefore allows undesirable high false-negative rates Ferrara et al. (2016).
Previous approaches such as SybilGuard, SybilResist, SybilLimit, and SybilInfer are not scalable to large-scale OSNs and
moreover they do not utilize information about known Sybil labels. In fact, these approaches only incorporate one labeled benign
node, which makes them not resilient to label noise and can only allow one node to be identified at a time and therefore finding
the Sybil region will be time-consuming due to the fact they need to examine the whole graph Gong et al. (2014); Ma et al.
(2014). Moreover, Liu et al. (2015) showed that these systems are vulnerable to temporal attacks, which can result in dramatic
gains over time and significantly degrade the security guarantees of the system in distributed sybil defenses such as SybilLimit or
can escape detection against centrally controlled sybil defenses such as SybilInfer. To attack random-walk based approaches,
the intruder has to choose (a) a good attack strategy and (b) gain some additional information which includes: (1) topology, (2)
trusted nodes, and (3) untrusted nodes to efficiently guide the creation of attacking edges, which allows him to obtain enough
trust Höner et al. (2017). Additionally, a trust leak in the first iteration can be exploited by a greedy strategy that iteratively adds
those attacking edges with the largest gain/leak per attacking edge in order to deceive the detector by increasing the trust values
of sybil nodes Höner et al. (2017).
4.1.1.2 Community detection approaches assume that OSNs under a social bot attack can be seen as two tightly-connected
communities, namely sybil and non-sybil communities.
First, we need to show how we can capture the community structure for a given social graph. Interestingly, the community
structure can be inferred by maximizing the modularity Newman and Girvan (2004). Clauset et al. (2004); Gao et al. (2015,
2018); Viswanath et al. (2011) used modularity to verify (or falsify) whether a large-scale Twitter network can be seen as two
communities. Clauset et al. (2004) experiments on real networks showed a significant community structure. However, Gao et al.
(2015, 2018) falsified this observation as they found that the partition consisting of the benign and sybil regions only has a very
low modularity. This assumption fails due to the fact that a considerable portion of the sybil nodes are isolated, and that the
number of attack edges per sybil node is high Gao et al. (2015, 2018).
Conductance is also a well-known metric to find good communities. Leskovec et al. (2008) informally defined the conductance
of a set of nodes as “The ratio of the number of cut edges between that set and its complement divided by the number of internal
edges inside that set", where lower conductance indicates stronger communities. Moreover, the conductance seems an interesting
metric from OSN defence perspective as it takes much more effort to appear legitimate under strong attacks. As the attacker
enlarges every cut with some probability p, which increases the cut with minimum conductance and, ultimately the conductance
of the whole network Alvisi et al. (2013).
Mislove et al. (2010) proposed a community detection approach based on a greedy approach to maximize the normalized
conductance. This approach was applied in the following studies to detect sybil communities. In Viswanath et al.’s work, they
selected Mislove’s algorithm, however with the different conductance metric, which is the mutual information between pairs
of rankings at all possible cutoff points (i.e. the boundary between the partitions). Ranking nodes can be achieved based on
how well the nodes are connected to a trusted node (i.e. based on SybilGuard or SybilLimit). This approach outperformed both
SybilGuard and SybilLimit. This is due to the fact that the number of Sybil nodes added is lower than the bound provided by
these two approaches.
Tan et al. (2013) proposed sybil defense-based spam detection scheme (SD2) based on user graph, which is formed by combining
the social graph and the user-link graph. In this scheme, community detection based on Viswanath et al.’s work is applied to the
user graph to rank nodes where non-sybil nodes will have higher ranks and sybil nodes will have lower ranks. Finally, a cutoff is
applied to ranked nodes based on the conductance ratio to identify sybil nodes as spammers.
Cai and Jermaine (2012) suggested that it is not enough to partition the network into tightly-connected communities. However,
these communities must simultaneously be studied to figure out how they are connected with the rest of the OSN. Therefore,
they proposed a latent community model for partitioning a graph into sub-networks. They applied Bayesian inference approach
for learning the LC model, as well as associated Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms. As the communities are
learned, they are simultaneously positioned in a latent, Euclidean space so that communities with tight interconnections are
positioned more closely than communities that are loosely connected. Therefore, attack communities tend to be seen as outliers
based on the proper latent positioning. LC approach outperformed Danezis and Mittal (2009); however, it does not work well
under a tree-topology attack (a tree has very low density).
Community detection methods need to take into account that a smart attacker may mimic the community structure of some
legitimate users to appear as a human account Ferrara et al. (2016). Additionally, the attacker may set-up the attack links to
deceptively appear as a part of a trusted node’s local community and again appear more legitimate Viswanath et al. (2011).
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Moreover, Viswanath et al. (2011) found that the effectiveness of community detection approaches depends on the level of
community structure present in the non-sybil region of the OSN. For instance, the performance increases in OSNs that have
low community structure and decreases in those with high community structure. Accordingly, OSNs appear to have many local
communities or groups, rather than two tightly-connected communities Cai and Jermaine (2012).
4.1.2 Relaxed assumption-based approaches
First, the previous approaches bound the accepted sybils to the number of attack edges based on social graph properties and
structure. As the third assumption suggests that the number of attack edges is limited. However, Sridharan et al. (2012); Boshmaf
et al. (2011) found that sybils are able to create a larger number of attack edges. In other words, the limited-attack-edges
assumption does not hold in real-world OSNs. Yang et al. (2014) showed that RenRen, the largest social networking platform in
China, does not follow this assumption, which also implies that real-world social networks may not necessarily represent strong
trust networks.
Second, Ghosh et al. (2012) examined the link farming phenomenon in the Twitter and they showed that specific users, called
social capitalists, have a tendency to follow back any account who follows them, in order to promote their content and to increase
their social capital. Spammers, on the other hand, can exploit this behavior to farm links and promote their malicious content.
This phenomenon can be seen as another evidence of that real-world social networks may not necessarily represent strong trust
networks and therefore honest region may not be easily separable from the sybil region Gao et al. (2015).
Third, Mohaisen et al. (2010) empirically observed that the mixing time of real-world social graphs is longer than the theoretical
anticipated value. The fast mixing assumption postulates the existence a small cut, a set of edges that together have small
stationary probability and whose removal disconnects the graph into two large sub-graphs Danezis and Mittal (2009); Gao et al.
(2015). More precisely, an OSN with weak trust does not show the fast mixing property Mulamba et al. (2016) and we already
have shown two cases in which real-world social networks do not necessarily represent strong trust relationship. Therefore, in
particular, we need better approaches that relax these assumptions in order to detect the sybil accounts that already have obtained
social edges to real users (i.e. to the honest region).
4.1.2.1 Weighted trust propagation-based approaches The following approaches propagate trust from a weighted social
graph via power iterations (i.e. a PageRank like approach). SybilFence Cao and Yang (2013) make use of the observation that
most of fake users receive a large number of legitimate users’ negative feedback, such as the rejections to their friend requests.
SybilFence reduces the weights of social edges on users that have received negative feedback, which, in turn, limits the impact of
sybils’ social edges. SybilFence adapts SybilRank approach to its weighted defense graph. It mainly consists of three steps: (1)
trust propagation, (2) trust normalization, and (3) ranking users based on their degree-normalized trust. SybilFence is resilience
to Sybils’ flooding requests and it outperforms SybilRank due to taking advantage from the consideration of negative feedback.
However, SybilFence assumes that the non-sybil region is well connected after social edges discount, which can be unrealistic
assumption in real-world social networks such as RenRen Yang et al. (2014).
VoteTrust Xue et al. (2013) is a global voting-based approach that combines link structure and users’ feedback to detect sybils
in OSNs. It assumes that the attacker can send many friendship requests to the honest users, however it can receive a large
amount of rejections Xue et al. (2013); Koll et al. (2017). The invitation graph is separated into two graphs: (1) the link initiation
graph, which models the link initiation interactions as a directed graph and (2) the link acceptance graph, which models the
link acceptance interactions as a weighted-directed graph. The weight value represents whether a user u accepts or rejects the
request. VoteTrust introduces two key techniques against collusive rating: (1) trust-based votes assignment and (2) global vote
aggregating. The first step includes vote propagation from trusted seeds, which assigns low voting capacity for sybil nodes and
thus prevents them from being involved in collusive rating. Then, it evaluates a global rating for each node by aggregating the
votes all over the OSN. VoteTurst essentially ignores the votes from nodes of very low capacity if their trusting rating falls below
a threshold, which forms a trade-off between collecting most votes and sybil community size. Interestingly, as sybil community
grows, the vote capacity decreases due to sharing a fixed number of incoming links. VoteTrust can detect attackers even when
sybil nodes are isolated and have many attack edges. However, VoteTrust can be invaded by tricking a few honest nodes into
sending requests to sybil nodes or by sending requests to friends of already established victims Koll et al. (2017).
4.1.2.2 Loopy belief propagation-based approaches SybilBelief Gong et al. (2014) utilizes information from a small set
of known benign and/or sybils users. It does not use random walks, instead it forms the problem of finding sybil accounts as
a semi-supervised learning problem, in which the goal is to propagate reputations from a small set of known benign and/or
sybils to other users along the social connections between them. SybilBelief mainly relies on the Markov Random Fields and
Loopy Belief Propagation, and performs orders of magnitude better than SybilLimit and SybilInfer in terms of both the number
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of accepted sybil nodes and the number of rejected benign nodes. However, the number of accepted Sybil nodes increases
dramatically when the labeled benign and Sybil nodes are highly imbalanced. SybilBelief adopts Loopy Belief Propagation
(LBP) to make inferences about the posterior information. However, for social networks with loops LBP approximates the
posterior probability distribution without theoretical convergence guarantees. Another limitation is that LBP-based methods are
sensitive to the number of iterations that the methods run Wang et al. (2017).
4.1.2.3 Hybrid approaches
4.1.2.3.1 Combining different graph-based approaches SybilRadar Mulamba et al. (2016) is a weighted trust propagation-
based approach to protect OSNs with weak trust relationships. It consists of three stages. The first stage includes computing of
similarity values between a given pair of nodes based on Adamic-Adar metric. The second step represents a refinement of the
previous step using another similarity metric, which is the Within-Inter-Community metric (WIC). The Louvain method Blondel
et al. (2008) is utilized to detect the corresponding communities, which are fed to the WIC similarity metric computation. The
resulting similarity values are assigned to the social graph edges as their weights, which are used to ensure that a big fraction
of the total trust will be distributed to legitimate nodes rather than to Sybil nodes. In the third stage, trust values are obtained
using a modified short random walk O(log n) on the weighted social graph. SybilRadar showed a good performance even when
the number of attack edges increases in compared to SybilRank. On the other hand, the increase in the size of the Sybil region
affects the performance of both SybilRadar and SybilRank. However, SybilRadar is less sensitive to the size of the Sybil region.
Graph-based approaches can be seen as iteratively applying a local rule to every node in a weighted social network. Wang et al.
(2017) proposed SybilSCAR a local rule that updates the posterior knowledge of a node by combining the influences from its
neighbours with its prior knowledge. Their proposed approach is able to tolerate label noise and guarantees the convergence on
real-world OSNs by a making use of a linear approximation of the multiplicative local rule and avoiding maintaining neighbour
influences associated with every edge. They associate a weight with each edge, which represents the probability that the two
corresponding users have the same label based on the homophily strength. Suppose a node v is node u’s neighbor, then the
local rule models v’s influence to a node u’s label as the probability that u is a sybil, given v’s information alone. SybilSCAR
achieves better detection accuracy than SybilRank and SybilBelief. SybilSCAR significantly outperformed SybilRank in terms
of accuracy and robustness to label noise, and SybilBelief in terms of scalability and convergence.
Zhang et al. (2018) proposed SybilSAN, a two-layer hyper-graph model to fully utilize users’ friendships and their corresponding
activities in an OSN in order to enhance the robustness of the sybil detection in the presence of a large number of attack edges.
They also introduced a new sybil attack model in which sybils can launch both friendship and activity attacks. They used Markov
chain mixing time to derive the number of rounds needed to guarantee that the iterative algorithm terminates. They decompose
the graph into three sub-graphs: (1) the friendship graph; (2) the activity-following graph; (3) the user-activity graph. For each
sub-graph, they designed a random walk to propagate trust independently. Finally, they present a unified algorithm to couple
these three random walks to capture a mutual reinforcement relationship between users and activities. Under different attack
scenarios SybilSAN outperformed SybilWalk, SybilSCAR and SybilRank. However, its performance degrades when the sybil
region is split into a larger number of disconnected clusters.
SybilBlind Wang et al. (2018) is a hybrid detection framework that does not rely on a manually labeled data. The main principle
is to randomly sample users from the social network, and using them as a training set. SybilBlind mainly consists of three stages:
(1) randomly sampling a noisy training set, (2) the noisy training set is then used as an input to state-of-the-art sybil detection
method (SybilSCAR), and (3) finally previously obtained results are aggregated based on homophily-entropy aggregator (HEA).
SybilBlind outperformed community detection Blondel et al. (2008), SybilRank, SybilSCAR (with sampling as training data)
and showed comparable performance with SybilBelief.
4.1.2.3.2 ML-aided graph-based approaches SybilFrame Gao et al. (2015) is a multi-stage classification approach that
makes use of the attributes of an individual node and the correlation between connected nodes. It consists of two stages of
inference. The first stage includes exploring the dataset and extracting useful information, in order to compute node prior
information and edge prior information based on SVM approach and similarity metrics respectively. This prior information
along with a small set of nodes whose labels are known will be fed into next stage, which represents the posterior inference layer
where the correlation between nodes is modeled using pairwise Markov Random Field.
Integro Boshmaf et al. (2015) extracts content-based features and use them to train a classifier that predicts potential victims of
sybil attacks. Then, the edges in the social graph are given weights according to their adjacency to the potential victims. The
ranking is then accomplished via a modified random walk. Both SybilFrame and Integro make use of structure- and content-based
information to achieve better detection accuracy.
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SybilFuse Gao et al. (2018) utilizes a collective classification approach and includes the following two steps: (1) training
local classifiers to compute local trust scores for nodes and edges, (2) propagating the local scores via weighted random walk
or weighted loopy belief propagation mechanisms. The experimental results showed that weighted loopy belief propagation
performs better than weighted random walks in all settings and it also achieved the best performance among all other evaluated
approaches which includes: SybilRank, SybilBelief, SybilSCAR, Integro in ranking both isolated sybils and sybils in the largest
connected component. Table 2 provides a comparison of graph-based detection approaches.
Table 2: Comparison of graph-based social bot detection approaches
Ref. Model Features Other Details
Yu et al. (2006) SybilGuard
Relies on intersections between of verifiable
random walks. Suffers from high false
negatives. Requires knowledge on the
complete network topology. It depends on
the number of attack edges.
Accepts O(
√
n log n) sybils per attack edge.
The length of the random walk is
O(
√
n log n). It contains O(
√
n)
independent samples drawn roughly
from the stationary distribution.
Yu et al. (2008) SybilLimit
Provides very weak guarantees when
high degree nodes are compromised
and can protect the system only
for f<0:01 compromised nodes.
SybilLimit accepts O(log n) sybils per attack
edge. Uses multiple instances (
√
m) of
short random walks O(log n) to sample
nodes from the honest set, where m
denotes the number of edges amongst
the honest nodes.
Danezis and Mittal
(2009)
SybilInfer
Uses Bayesian inference to detect approximate
cuts between honest and sybil node regions.
Compromised nodes get no advantage by
connecting any additional sybil nodes.
Depends primarily on the number of colluding
malicious nodes not on the number of attack
edges. Also independent of the topology
of the adversary region.
The length of the random walk is O(log |V |).
It does not specify any upper-bound
guarantee on false rates and provides
weaker guarantees in practice since
the adversary can inject sybils into
a region undetected as long as the
threshold Exx is not exceeded.
Viswanath et al. (2011) Communitydetection
Community detection based on Mislove’s
algorithm and the mutual information
between pairs of rankings at all possible
cutoff points as a conductance metric.
A smart attacker may mimic the community
structure of other legitimate users or set-up
the attack links to deceptively appear as
part of a trusted node’s local community
Cai and Jermaine
(2012)
Latent
community
model
The communities are learned and positioned in
a latent Euclidean space so that communities
with tight interconnections are positioned
more closely than communities that
are loosely connected
LC approach does not work well
under a tree-topology attack
(a tree has very low density)
Cao et al. (2012) SybilRank Constructs a defense graph withreduced weights on attack edges.
Requires that sybil region have a longer
mixing time than the non-sybil region
and assumes that legitimate users refuse
to interact with unknown accounts.
Xue et al. (2013) VoteTrust
Combines link structure and users’ feedback
to detect sybils and includes (1) trust-based
votes assignment and (2) vote aggregating
As sybil community grows, the vote capacity
decreases due to sharing of a fixed number of
incoming links. It can be invaded by tricking
a few honest nodes into sending requests
to sybils or by sending requests to friends
of already established victims
Gong et al. (2014) SybilBelief Relies on the Markov Random Fieldsand Loopy Belief Propagation
The number of accepted sybils increases
dramatically when the labeled benign
and sybil nodes are highly imbalanced
Ma et al. (2014) SybilResist Detects the sybil region, a sub-graph of sybilnodes which, doesn’t have a small cut.
Random walks of O(log n). However
its performance changes according to the
length of random walks used in each step.
Boshmaf et al. (2015) Integro Weighted graph-based on the adjacencyto potential victims
Makes use of structure- and content-based
features to achieve better detection
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
Ref. Model Features Other Details
Gao et al. (2015) SybilFrame
Computes node prior information and edge
prior information based on SVM approach and
similarity metrics respectively. Then, the
correlation between nodes is modeled using
pairwise Markov Random Field.
Its performance depends on the
accuracy of external classifier
Mulamba et al. (2016) SybilRadar
A hybrid approach in which weights of the
edges are assigned according to similarity
values based on inter-community similarity
metric. Thereafter, trust values are
obtained using a modified short random walk.
The increase in the size of the sybil
region affects its performance. However,
SybilRadar is less sensitive to the size
of the Sybil region than SybilRank.
Wang et al. (2017) SybilSCAR
Unify random walk-based methods and loop
belief propagation-based methods and updates
the posterior of a node by combining its
neighbours influence with its prior knowledge
Each edge has a weight that represents
the probability that the two corresponding
nodes have the same label based on the
homophily strength
Wang et al. (2018) SybilBlind
Randomly sampling a noisy data, which is
used as an input to a sybil detection system
(SybilSCAR) to detect sybils, and then
aggregates the results from multiples sampling
trials based on homophily-entropy aggregator
The main advantage is that it
does not rely on a manually
labeled training set
Gao et al. (2018) SybilFuse
Propagates the local trust scores via
weighted random walk or weighted
loopy belief propagation mechanisms
Local classifiers to compute local
trust scores for nodes and edge.
However, weighted loopy belief
propagation performs better.
Zhang et al. (2018) SybilSAN
Three random walks on three sub-graphs
to capture a mutual relationship
between users & activities
Shows a low performance when the sybil
region is split into a large number of
disconnected clusters.
4.2 Machine learning approaches
Machine learning-based social bot detection approaches can be categorized into the following two groups:
4.2.1 Supervised machine learning approaches
Supervised Machine Learning (ML) approaches focus on various features that allow distinguishing between human and bot
accounts. User meta-data and content features have been proven to be the most predictive and the most interpretable ones that
can be compared with that of legitimate users to infer whether an account is likely a social bot or not Fazil and Abulaish (2018);
Varol et al. (2017a); Fernquist et al. (2018).
Wang (2010) applied supervised ML approach based on three content-based and three graph-based features to distinguish
between human and spam bots accounts. Well-known classification approaches, such as decision tree (DT), neural network (NN),
support vector machines (SVM), and Naive Bayesian (NB) were applied to identify spam bots on Twitter. NB showed the best
results as it is more robust against noisy data.
Stringhini et al. (2010) employed classification (Random Forest- RF) approach based on the following features: friend requests
ratio, URL ratio, message similarity, friend choice, messages sent and friends number. They also aggregated different spam
campaigns according to URLs that advertised the same page.
Lee et al. (2011b) utilized Expectation Maximization (EM) approach to group malicious bots into four categories (Duplicate
spammer, @ spammer, malicious promoter and friends infiltrator) based on Expectation Maximization (EM) approach. Then
employed naive bayes, logistic regression, support vector machine (SVM), and ensemble learning based on RF to predict whether
a candidate Twitter account is a social bot or not. They utilized features that belong to the following four groups: 1) user
demographics, 2) user friendship networks, 3) user content and 4) user history. The experimental results showed that boosting of
RF achieved the best results.
Chu et al. (2012) proposed a four-stage approach to distinguish between human, bot and cyborg accounts. Their system consists
of four stages: 1) computing corrected conditional entropy to detect periodic or regular timing, 2) spam detection based on
text-based Bayesian classification, 3) computing the bot deviation from the normal human distribution based on account-related
features, and 4) finally decision making based on random forest approach.
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Yang et al. (2013) proposed 10 novel features including (3) graph-based, (3) neighbor-based, (3) automation-based and (1)
timing-based feature to infer whether a Twitter account is genuine or spambot. Graph-based and neighbor-based features were
useful to find malicious bots who attempt to evade profile-based features by adjusting their own social behaviors. Whereas
automation-based and timing-based features were proposed to detect social bots that attempt to evade content-based features by
increasing the number of their human-like tweets. These novel features were evaluated using four different machine learning
classifiers namely Random Forest (RF), Decision Tree (DT), Bayes Net (BN) and Decorate (DE). Accordingly, one can observe
that RF was widely employed in supervised ML-based approaches and achieved the best results in Stringhini et al. (2010); Lee
et al. (2011b); Chu et al. (2012); Yang et al. (2013).
Tavares and Faisal (2013) applied Naive Bayes classifier to distinguish between personal, managed and bot based on distribution
of tweet time interval. They found that the power-law distributions of inter-tweet delays shows a clear difference across these
three mentioned classes. They also showed that it is possible to predict the probability distribution of a user’s the time delay with
a coefficient of determination of ∼ 0.7.
Dickerson et al. (2014) employed ensemble of classifiers (including support vector machines (SVM), Gaussian naive Bayes,
AdaBoost, gradient boosting, random forests (RF), and extremely randomized trees) based on tweet syntax, tweet semantics (at
the individual user or neighborhood level), user behavior and network-centric user features. They also applied sentiment analysis
on a per-user basis over a variety of topics based on Benamara et al.; Subrahmanian and Reforgiato; Barbosa and Feng; Agarwal
et al.. Moreover, they identified topics discussed by various Twitter users by employing latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) to
classify individuals as either bots or humans. They also employed kernel principal component analysis (PCA) for de-noising and
dimensionality reduction where AdaBoost performed best on the reduced feature set, and gradient boosting performed best on
the full feature set. Their sentiment features improved the accuracy of the classifier. In particular, the Area under the ROC Curve
(AUC) increased from 0.65 to 0.73. Interestingly, they found that when a user’s fraction of tweets with sentiment between 0.5
and 0.9, he/she is much more likely to be a human than a bot.
Oentaryo et al. (2016) utilized four classifiers, namely NB, RF, SVM and logistic regression (LR) to distinguish between human
accounts and three types of bots namely broadcast, consumption and spam bots. They considered profile-, follow-, static (i.e.,
time-independent) and dynamic tweet-based (i.e., time-dependent) features. Overall, LR and SVM showed the best results.
Fazil and Abulaish (2018) identified six newly features and two redefined features. The six new features include one content-
based, three interaction-based, and two community-based features. The redefined features are content-based. These features
were fed to RF, DT and Bayesian network classifiers to distinguish between automated spammers and legitimate users. They
found that interaction- and community-based features are the most effective features for spam detection, whereas metadata-based
features are the least effective ones. The interaction-based features, focused on the followers of a user, rather than on the ones
he/she is following because these features cannot be determined by the user. The experimental results showed that RF achieved
the best results over DT and Bayesian network. This approach can be seen as a hybrid approach as it depend on graph-based
features as well as content-based features.
Davis et al. (2016); Varol et al. (2017a) proposed BotOrNot, in which they applied RF approach based on more than 1,000
features using user profile-, friending- and network-, temporal-, content- and sentiment-based features extracted from interaction
patterns and content. BotOrNot mainly computes the botness of a certain user (i.e. the likelihood that an account is a bot).
Various off-the-shelf classification methods were tested, including logistic regression, DT, RF and AdaBoost. However, the
experimental results showed that RF is the most accurate to produce bot-likelihood scores. Grimme et al. (2018), on the other
hand, showed that the average user’s score of BotOrNot drops significantly when bots start spreading tweets through the network.
This is due to the fact that BotOrNot’s features include the number of tweets and retweets of a particular account, which change
during the spreading phase.
Ahmed and Abulaish (2013) proposed 14 generic statistical features, which fall in the following four categories: interactions,
posts/ tweets, URLs, and tags/mentions. These features were evaluated using NB, Jrip, and J48. The best results were achieved
using J48 decision tree algorithm. Beg˘enilmis¸ and Uskudarli (2018) proposed supervised ML-based detection of organized
behavior based on RF, SVM, and LR approaches. They employed user and temporal features to distinguish between three
categories: organized- vs. organic- behavior, pro-Trump vs. pro-Hillary vs none and political vs. nonpolitical. Their method
utilized features of collective behavior in hashtag-based tweet sets, which were collected by querying hashtags of interest. Again,
the experimental results showed that RF achieves the best results with full features, however LR and SVM algorithms give better
results when PCA is applied.
Fernquist et al. (2018) applied RF approach to recognize automatic behaviours and detects bots that tweet about the Swedish
election using meta-data and tweet (content-based) features. This approach showed better results when compared with Davis et al.
(2016), Yang et al. (2011), Miller et al. (2014) and Ahmed and Abulaish (2013). They also found that the most significant feature
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is the number of likes the account has given divided by the number of friends the account has. The second most significant
feature is the ratio between the number of followers and friends followed by the time between retweets. Al-Qurishi et al. (2018a)
employed a deep regression model for sybil detection in OSNs based on profile-, content- and graph-based features. The system
includes the following three modules: (1) data harvesting module, (2) feature extracting mechanism, and (3) deep-regression
model. The system was able to achieve a good accuracy.
Al-Qurishi et al. (2018b) utilized three levels of analysis and features namely (1) user-generated content, (2) social graph
connections, and (3) user profile activities, in order to detect anomalous behaviors in OSNs. The key concept in this study is
leveraging contextual activity information among OSN users. They also employed principal component analysis (PCA) along
with a ranking methodology to weight these features according to their relative importance in the examined dataset. Moreover,
to detect a topic behavior, they used latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) approach. Accordingly, they found that all OSN users
appear to be remarkably similar until they consider their corresponding activity traits, in which significant contradictions occur.
They also found that malicious users target particular topics with different activities whereas normal users involved in different
activities related to several topics. Their iterative regression model achieved the best results among RF, J48, regression and SVM.
Supervised ML approaches are unable to find zero-day malicious bots Adewole et al. (2017). Indeed, they need a labelled
dataset that captures the features and the behaviors of a diverse set of bots. To this end, Echeverría et al. (2018) proposed
“Leave-One-Botnet-Out” (LOBO), to allow supervised ML algorithms to be trained on data with multiple types of social bots.
This method is derived from cross validation in which a subset of the available data is kept out, and used for testing on N number
of fold. It is also worth noting that some features are computationally expensive to extract from large OSNs Adewole et al. (2017).
Interestingly Cresci et al. (2015) showed that the best performing features are also the most costly ones. This clearly shows a
trade-off between having an accurate classifier or a time-efficient one. Another drawback is that the features may be tailored for
specific OSN. For instance, the number of friends request is not public on Facebook Stringhini et al. (2010). This suggests the
need for a cross-OSN approach that takes into consideration different OSNs rather than being applicable to a particular OSN.
Apart from that, social bots evolve over time, and therefore supervised ML approaches that analyze one account at a time are
unable to effectively detect this type of bots Yang et al. (2013); Cresci et al. (2018b,c). Moreover, such techniques may miss
other stealthy bots, which are currently not being activated. Therefore, it might be useful to take into consideration a feedback
from other users as a potential feature in ML approaches Cao and Yang (2013). However, this may require (1) additional data
that represents possible legitimate and malicious behaviors in OSNs, (2) a model that can correctly distinguish and generalize
well from the training dataset. Furthermore, Chavoshi et al. (2016a) claim that different approaches may not be able to detect all
the dynamics of social bots based on limited features, which results in a smaller overlapping in terms of bot detection across
these different approaches. In addition, Cresci et al. (2017) experimentally showed that most of supervised ML approaches fail
by mimicking the characteristics of genuine users. Legitimate users also may purchase fake accounts to promote their profiles.
This can make detection of social bots by content/behavioral based features much more challenging.
4.2.2 Unsupervised machine learning approaches
Unsupervised ML approaches are able to find hidden patterns without relying on labelled data. They mainly focus on discovering
specific patterns in the input. Clustering is a good example of unsupervised learning, which is used for finding useful clusters
based on similar properties defined by an appropriate distance metric Latah (2019). Therefore, this approach is useful for
detecting malicious campaigns, instead of inspecting individual messages of OSN users.
Gao et al. (2012) proposed incremental clustering and classification approach to distinguish between spam and legitimate cluster
using text-based features that fall into two categories. OSN-specific features, and general features, which can be used to detect
spam outside OSNs. The system incrementally updates the clustering result with minimal computational overhead. When the
classifier detects a spam message, it will only trigger a spam alarm on that particular message, rather than on all the messages
in the cluster. However, under stealthy attacks (i.e. by reducing the attack speed and messages generated) more spam clusters
become indistinguishable from legitimate message clusters.
Miller et al. (2014) employed modified versions of DenStream and StreamKM++ algorithms, which are based on DBSCAN
and k-means, for detection of spam bots over Twitter stream. The original algorithms were designed to process batch data.
The features used in this work fall into content- and user-based features. This approach treat the spam detection as an anomaly
detection problem rather than as a classification problem. StreamKM++ achieved 99% recall and 6.4% false positive rate (FPR);
and DenStream produced 99% recall and 2.8% FPR. When combined together, these algorithms reached 100% recall and a 2.2%
FPR.
BotWalk Minnich et al. (2017) computes an aggregated anomaly score based on an ensemble of unsupervised anomaly detection
methods. BotWalk focuses on specific patterns of automated behavior based on 130 features extracted from network, content,
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temporal and meta-data information. Starting from a seed-bot and a set of random accounts, BotWalk retrieves each account’s
details, timeline, and one-hop follower neighborhood, with the goal of maximizing the likelihood of reaching other bots across
the OSN. The output of this approach is an aggregated score, obtained by combining four different anomaly detection scores.
The experimental results showed that BotWalk was able to detect 7,995 previously undiscovered bots from a sample of 15 seed
bots with a precision of 90%.
Chen and Subramanian (2018) applied an unsupervised approach based on similarity metric. The algorithm includes two
parameters minimum duplicate factor and overlap ratio, which both need to be tuned. The algorithm takes the 200 most recent
tweets of each account as input and returns each bot group along with the most frequent embedded URL tweeted by that group.
Then, Selenium is used to simulate a web browser and checks if a URL is malicious or not. They found that bots account
for 10% to 50% of tweets generated from 7 URL shortening services and they were connected to large-scale spam campaigns
that control thousands of domains. Briefly, we can observe that the ability to find malicious groups comes with the price of
higher computational cost. Therefore, more efforts are needed to improve the speed of clustering and reduce the computational
complexity. In Table 3, we provide a comparison of ML-based detection approaches.
Table 3: Comparison of machine learning-based social bot detection approaches
Ref. Approach Features Classes Camp.Detection
Wang DT, NN, SVM, NB Content- and graph-based features Human or spam bot 7
Chu et al. Random Forest
Entropy of tweeting intervals as a
measure of behavior complexity,
tweet content and account properties
Human, bot or cyborg 7
Stringhini et al. Random Forest
Friend requests ratio, URL ratio,
message similarity, friend choice,
messages sent, friends number.
Spam bot
(Displayer, bragger,
poster and whisperer)
or not.
7
Lee et al.
EM for cluster analysis
Classification based on
NB, SVM, logistic
regression, and RF
User demographics,
user friendship networks,
user content and user history.
Duplicate spammer,
@ spammer, malicious
promoter and friends
infiltrator or not.
7
Tavares and
Faisal
Naive Bayes classifier Distribution of Tweet time interval Personal, managedand bot. 7
Yang et al. NB, DT, RF, DE Graph-based, neighbor-based, timing-based and automation-based features Bot or not. 7
Oentaryo et al. NB, RF, SVM and LR Profile-, follow-, static anddynamic tweet-based features.
Broadcast, consumption
and spam bots 7
Fazil and Abu-
laish
RF, DT and
Bayesian Network
Metadata-, content-, interaction- and
community-based features.
Automated spammer
or a legitimate user. 7
Davis et al.;
Varol et al.
Random Forest User profile,friending, network,temporal,content and sentiment features.
Bot-likelihood score
between [0,1]. 7
Echeverría et al.
Tree-based approaches:
DT,RF,LGBM, XGBC
and AdaBoost
User and tweet-based features. Multiple bot types. 7
Beg˘enilmis¸ and
Uskudarli
RF, SVM, and LR User and temporal features.
Organized/organic,
pro-Trump/-Hillary
political or not.
7
Fernquist et al. Random forest Meta-data and tweet(content) features. Bot or not. 7
Al-Qurishi et al.
(2018a)
Deep regression model Profile-based, content basedand network-based. Bot or not. 7
Al-Qurishi et al.
(2018b)
Iterative regression, RF,
J48, regression & SVM.
User-generated content, social graph
connections, and user profile activities. Bot or not 7
Dickerson et al.
SVM, NB, AdaBoost, RF,
gradient boosting, and
extremely randomized trees
Tweet syntax, tweet semantics
user behavior, network-centric
user properties.
Bot or human. 7
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Ahmed and Abu-
laish
NB, Jrip, and J48 Interactions, posts/ tweets, URLs, andtags/mentions-based features. Spammer or not. 7
Gao et al. Incremental clusteringand classification Text-based features.
Spam or
legitimate cluster. X
Miller et al. DenStream andStreamKM++ content- and user-based features. Bot or not. X
Minnich et al.
Ensemble of unsupervised
anomaly detection
approaches
Network, content, temporal
and metadata information Anomaly score X
Chen and Subra-
manian
Clustering Minimum duplicate factorand overlap ratio. Bot or not. X
GBDT: Gradient Boosting Decision Tree, XGBC: Extreme Gradient Boost Classifier.
4.3 Emerging approaches
4.3.1 Detection of coordinated attacks
Detecting the whole botnet, can help identifying a specific campaign and revealing the aggressive behavior of the botnet Grimme
et al. (2018). Therefore, in this section we focus on approaches that aim to detect coordinated social bot attacks. In spite of the
fact that sophisticated bots may use different features/characteristics, however they must have the same goal Cresci et al. (2018a),
which can be inferred based on their coordinated behavior.
Fields (2018) investigated similarity and threshold-based scoring for detecting botnet campaigns. The author utilized the
following features: text similarity, occurrence of similar text, summation of similarly score with N neighbors, location, entropy,
sentiment, user and profile-based features. These features also were assigned weights, however neither the thresholds no the
assigned weights were backed by any statistical proof or explanation.
CopyCatch Beutel et al. (2013) focuses on detecting malicious Page Likes on Facebook. They search for lockstep behaviour
groups of users acting together at around the same time. First, they constructed a bipartite graph between users and pages,
with the time at which each edge was created. Then, they proposed subspace clustering approach in which a group of users
considered suspicious if there exists a hypercube of width 2∆t in at least m dimensions such that at least n users fall within that
hypercube where 2∆t represents the width of time window. To find suspicious clusters they define an optimization problem,
in which the goal is to maximize the number of suspicious users and the number of Page Likes of suspicious users inside the
appropriate cluster in the subspace. To increase the scalability, they implemented their algorithm in MapReduce framework.
CopyCatch detects tightly synchronized behaviours that occur only once, however it cannot catch other generic actions such as
repeatedly uploading spam-photo Cao et al. (2014). Another limitation of CopyCatch is detecting only synchronized lockstep
behavior forming blocks, while leaving non− overlapping and partially overlapping lockstep behaviors undetected Jiang
et al. (2016b). These limitation are addressed in the next approaches.
In SynchroTrap Cao et al. (2014) applied clustering analysis for detecting loosely synchronized actions from malicious accounts
in large-scale OSNs. CopyCatch can detect fraudulent page likes that happen only once, however it cannot find other generic
actions (i.e. repeatedly uploading spam-photo from the same IP addresses). Unlike CopyCatch, SynchroTrap decouples the
similarity metrics from the clustering algorithm, which allows handling both once-only and other generic actions. A time-stamped
action is represented with a tuple abstraction that allows the system design to be independent of the OSN applications that
SynchroTrap protects. A user’s actions are categorized into subsets according to the applications they belong to, which is
called application contexts. Attacker’s network resource constraint is used to reduce the pairwise comparisons depending on
a specific application context. Comparison results are aggregated to detect malicious actions over a longer period such as a
week. For scalability concerns, they employed a parallel version of single-linkage hierarchical clustering algorithm. SynchroTrap
achieved high precision (more than 99%) and was able to find malicious activities that were undetectable by previous approaches,
which also indicates that the loosely synchronized attacks have been neglected in previous defence approaches. During one
month of deployment, SynchroTrap unveiled 1156 large campaigns and more than two million malicious accounts, but it does
not detect them in real time. It runs on a 200-machine cluster at Facebook and it takes a few hours to process the daily data and
∼15 hours to process a weekly aggregation job. Being undetected for long time can cause enormous damage for OSNs.
As we mentioned previously, CopyCatch can detect only lockstep behavior forming blocks. To catch non-overlapping and
partially overlapping lockstep behaviors Jiang et al. (2016b) proposed LockInfer, in which they observed that lockstep behavior
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patterns show strange connectivity patterns, and the spectral subspace of adjacency matrix presents strange shapes in the plots.
Their proposed method consists of two steps: (1) seed selection, which includes selecting nodes that behave in lockstep based on
spectral-subspace plots (2) lookstep propagation, which propagates lockstep scores between followers and followees. LockInfer
outperformed the existing methods with high (99–100%) detection accuracy.
As synchronized behaviour can be viewed as an indicator of malicious activity, Giatsoglou et al. (2015) developed a method
for detecting such malicious behaviour, given a set of users and a set of retweets within a period of time. They considered
timing-based features of user’s retweets. Their approach consists of three steps: (1) feature subspace sweeping; (2) user scoring;
(3) multivariate outlier detection. The first step includes projection of all features into all possible feature subspaces, and then
segment each subspace by applying logarithmic binning, in powers of 2, in each dimension. The next step is calculating a
suspiciousness score on each feature subspace. Each user is represented by a vector that contains obtained scores over all feature
subspaces. The last step is multivariate outlier detection, which includes finding robust feature subspace that fits the majority of
users and subsequently considers the users who are largely far from the majority as outlier users. Their method achieved 97%
accuracy and 0.82% F1-score.
Jiang et al. (2014) proposed CATCHSYNC, a graph mining approach for spotting suspicious behaviors in OSN. They considered
both synchronized and rare (very different from the majority) behaviors as an indicator of suspiciousness. They chose the degree
values, hubness and authoritativeness HITS score as their feature space. Specifically, they chose out-degree vs hubness, for each
source node, and in-degree vs authoritativeness, for each target node. They also introduced two metrics namely synchronicity
and normality to quantify these behaviors based on relative position of u’s target nodes in the feature space (i.e. indegree vs
authoritativeness). Let’s assume that we have a node x. Then, the synchronicity is measured by the average closeness between
each pair of x’s targets. Whereas the normality is measured by the average closeness between each pair of x’s targets and other
nodes. They showed that it is possible to find the outliers based on the existence of a provable lower bound in the synchronicity vs
normality (SN)-plot. Suspicious source nodes Usync includes the nodes whose suspiciousness is α=3.0 times standard deviations
aways from the mean. Whereas the suspiciousness of a target node is the proportion of its sources that are reported in Usync.
The authors also showed that CATCHSYNC can restore the power law properties of the graph’s edge degree after removing
the suspicious nodes from the graph. They applied CATCHSYNC on two large, real datasets 1-billion-edge Twitter social
graph and 3-billion-edge Tencent Weibo social graph, and also other synthetic ones. They found that CATCHSYNC achieved
better accuracy by 36% on Twitter and 20% on Tencent Weibo, as well as in speed when compared with Perez et al. (2011) and
Moonesinghe and Tan (2008). However, it performs poorly when the attacks become denser due to the fact that the synchronicity
will become less significant, and therefore CATCHSYNC efficient only on isolated dense blocks Zhao et al. (2018). In addition,
bots with few followers and followees cannot score their suspiciousness due to their poor structural information. Combining
CATCHSYNC with content-based approaches can be a solution to reduce the resulted false negatives Jiang et al. (2016a).
Zhao et al. (2018) proposed a method that collectively considers all target users’ decisions for finding the optimal action against
frauds or bots by target users themselves. Every target user can investigate the average rating of each source user who wants to
contact with. If the average rating is lower than a specific threshold, then the target user assumes that the source user is more
likely to be a bot. It is also expected that source users who were attacked to have a high threshold and otherwise source users will
have low thresholds.
Mesnards and Zaman (2018) observed that social bots interact with humans much more frequently than they interact with each
other. Based on this observation they proposed a method inspired by Ising model from statistical physics to model the network
structure and bot labels. They also found that the maximum likelihood estimation of the bot labels in this model can be reduced
to finding a minimum cut on an equivalent graph called energy graph. This approach performed better than BotOrNot Davis et al.
(2016) in terms of AUC and run time. It also showed low false positives, due to the fact it takes into consideration the interaction
of the source and the target.
Gupta et al. (2019) proposed a method that consists of three steps: (1) community detection for coarse-grained group detection
of malicious retweet groups (2) pruning algorithm for fine-grained group detection and decreasing of the number of false positive
followed by supervised classifier, which makes use of a set of 23 group-based features; both entropy-based and temporal-based, to
train the model. The fine-grained detection includes decomposition of an undirected weighted retweeter network for a candidate
group obtained from the previous step into n-sub-graphs. Thereafter, they find the maximal cliques (MC) from each group such
that there should be no overlap between the nodes of two maximal cliques. Then, they compute the frequency of retweets for
each MC and sort them in descending order of frequency of retweets to capture cascading retweeting behaviors based on a
threshold that determines the point at which there is a drastic fall in rewteeting frequency. This step divides the set into seed
groups (greater than the threshold) or a set of candidate nodes (less than the threshold). Therefore, they calculate the number of
common retweets between a candidate node and a seed group. A candidate node is added to the seed group with which it has
maximum common retweets. This approach achieved an accuracy of 82.88 along with an AUC of 0.921 using RF classifier.
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Benigni et al. (2019) focused on extracting largest distinct sub-graphs that exceed a predefined minimum size and density
threshold based on a large sparse, weighted, reciprocal mention graph. Then, they manually inspected sub-graphs for botnet-like
behavior. Sub-graph density is defined by summing link weights. In this study, they found multiple sub-communities of bots,
each with a distinct intention.
Yan (2013) applied relative ranking of nodes in a graph to detect three types of botnets that attempt to hide themselves in
OSNs. The first type is standalone botnets, which are isolated from the normal online social network. The second type is
appendix botnets, which have only one direction following relationships. The third type is crossover botnet, which have following
relationships in both directions between bots and normal users. They used the betweenness and out-degree centrality to define
the core of Twitter graph. To find these types of bots the reachability is calculated at different levels : 1) for the nodes outside the
core of the graph, 2) after removing strongly connected components from the graph, 3) after removing all nodes in the core from
the giant weakly connected component. The nodes that exceeds a threshold at any level are monitored to find potential botnet
activities. Mainly this approach decreases the number of monitored nodes except when every bot is node. The main disadvantage,
however, is that it requires a clean core without malicious bots to function effectively and it has an offline component.
Gao et al. (2010) detected spam campaigns on Facebook by identifying connected subgraphs in wall posts graph. An edge
is formed when two posts share the same destination URL or strong textual similarity. They assume that a) each account is
limited in terms of the number of wall posts it can post, and b) messages in a single campaign are relatively bursty in time (i.e.
time-synchronized). Then, they applied threshold filters based on the number of user accounts sending wall posts and time
correlation within each subgraph to detect potentially malicious clusters. However, the time complexity for pairwise comparison
with all wall posts is O(n2), which can be significant for large values of n. Moreover, clever bots can evade detection by gradually
increasing the rate of spam messages.
Lee et al. (2011a) identified top spam campaigns by applying graph mining on message graph, in which edges correspond
to a content-based correlation between messages with similar talking points. They explored three approaches for extracting
campaigns: (i) loose extraction, which includes the set of all maximally connected components in the message graph, (ii) strict
extraction, which includes finding maximal cliques, and (iii) cohesive extraction, which focuses on balancing loose and strict
extraction by relaxing the conditions of maximal cliques. The experimental results showed that for small datasets the cohesive
and strict approaches outperform the loose and cluster-based approaches. For large datasets, on the other hand, the cohesive
extraction outperformed the strict extraction by combining multiple related cliques into a single campaign. In Table 4, we provide
a comparison of coordinated attacks detection approaches.
Table 4: Comparison of coordinated attacks detection approaches
Ref. Approach Features Classes Camp.Detection
Fields (2018) Similarity and threshold-based scoring
Text similarity-features with N
neighbors, location, entropy, sentiment,
user and profile-based features.
Bot or not X
Beutel et al.
(2013)
Subspace clustering Bipartite graph betweenusers and Pages Suspicious behavior X
Giatsoglou
et al. (2015)
Multivariate outlier
detection
A vector that contains obtained
scores over all feature subspaces Malicious behaviour X
Jiang et al.
(2014)
Graph mining approach Social graph Suspicious behavior X
Cao et al.
(2014)
Single-linkage
hierarchical clustering Generic time-stamped actions Bot or not X
Jiang et al.
(2016b)
Graph-based lockstep
behavior inference
Adjacency matrix and
spectral subspaces Lockstep behaviors X
Zhao et al.
(2018)
Finding optimal threshold
for each target user Adjacency matrix
User’s blocklist
thresholds X
Mesnards and
Zaman (2018)
Ising model Energy graph mapped from aninteraction network/graph Bot or not X
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Table 4 – continued from previous page
Ref. Approach Features Classes Camp.Detection
Gupta et al.
(2019)
Three-step approach:
1- community detection
2- pruning algorithm
3- supervised classification.
Social graph, group-based features:
(1) entropy- and (2) temporal-based.
Malicious or benign
group X
Benigni et al.
(2019)
Extracting largest
distinct subgraphs
Large sparse, weighted,
reciprocal mention graph
Promoted account,
community influencer. X
Yan (2013) Graph-based approach Original twitter graph Standalone, appendixand crossover botnets. X
Gao et al.
(2010)
Detecting connected
subgraphs.
Wall posts graph formed according
to same destination URL or strong
textual similarity.
Malicious (URL/Post)
or not. X
Lee et al.
(2011a)
Graph mining
Message graph, in which edges
correspond to a content-based
correlation between messages.
Top campaigns. X
4.3.2 Other emerging approaches
As malicious spam bots cannot control their followers to follow them, a lot of legitimate OSN users but few of them follow back
these malicious spammers, taking this observation into consideration Feng et al. (2017) proposed GroupFound, a method that
exploits the bi-follow relationship of a target-node to establish an undirected graph. First, they get the two layers of neighbor
nodes of the target-node. Then, they compute the similarity of every two nodes among the neighbor-nodes of a target node by
computing the Jaccard index. Then, they obtain a similarity matrix, which will be used to calculate the groups of target-node.
Each row is considered as a record and every column can be viewed as a feature. For each row they calculate a mean value
vector and the distance from each node of the neighbor-nodes of the target node to the mean. The algorithm is mainly based on
hierarchical clustering. GroupFound achieved a detection rate of 86:27% with a false positive rate of 8:54%.
Cresci et al. (2018a) observed that it is not enough to merely depend on the history of previous behaviour records to detect
new generations of spam bots. Instead, we need to investigate collective behaviors of users’ groups to determine whether these
account are bots or not. To this end, they proposed DNA sequences for modeling the behaviors of OSN users. Their model
considers sequences as ordered lists of symbols, with variable length, taken from a relatively small alphabet. The longest
common sub-string (LCS) between two or more DNA sequences can be used to measure similarities between these sequences.
They found that the LCS of spam bots are long even when the number of accounts grows, whereas legitimate users show low
to zero similarities. Accordingly they were able to uncover traces of an automated and synchronized activity. Based on LCSs,
they proposed supervised and unsupervised approaches where the supervised approach achieves slightly better results. The
experimental results showed that this approach was able to outperform Yang et al., Ahmed and Abulaish (2013) and Miller
et al. (2014). Interestingly, the very low recall of Yang et al. (2013) can be seen as an evidence of a new generation of social
bots that are hard to detect when they are considered individually even using current state-of-the-art algorithms. Cresci et al.
(2018a) approach is flexible in terms of not focusing on specific characteristics. Moreover, it reduces the cost for data gathering
by not considering the properties of the social graph. However, to detect more sophisticated types of bots, partial matches can be
considered instead of exact ones. In other words, instead of using the longest common sub-string, it is possible utilize longest
common sub-sequence metric as they suggested.
Clark et al. (2016) focused on three distinct classes of automated tweeting: robots, cyborgs and human spammers. Their method
classifies accounts merely based on linguistic attributes. They make use of the following three distinct linguistic features: (i)
average pairwise tweet dissimilarity (ii) word introduction rate decay parameter and (iii) average number of URLs per tweet.
They found that for legitimate users, these three attributes are densely clustered, but they can vary greatly for automatons. Their
approach classifies each user as an automated account if their feature falls further than n standard deviations away from the
legitimate user mean, for varying n. This step is referred to as calibration phase. Moreover, they found many cyborgs send
incomplete messages followed by an ellipsis and a URL. The experimental results showed that the AUC increases as the number
of collected tweets increase. However, it showed a large false positive rate (22%) for human accounts when the same approach
was applied to another set of accounts collected from social Honeypot experiment Lee et al.. They achieved better results by
applying another calibration phase.
Varol et al. (2017b) observed that promoted trends on Twitter are sustained by organic activity before promotion, and therefore
they are essentially indistinguishable from organic ones until the promotion triggers the trending behaviour. Consequently
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as more users join the conversation, these trends tend to be more indistinguishable from the organic ones. Therefore, they
focused on early detection of promoted trending memes based on the temporal sequence of messages associated with a particular
trending hashtag and classifying it as either promoted or organic. They used 487 features, which can be categorized into five
classes: network structure and information diffusion patterns, content and language, sentiment, timing, and user meta-data. They
also applied wrapper approach to select features where they train and evaluate models using the candidate subsets of features
and expand the set of selected features using greedy forward feature selection. A k-nearest neighbor approach with Dynamic
Time Warping (kNN-DTW) was proposed to deal with multi-dimensional time series classification problem. Time series for
each feature were processed in parallel using dynamic time warping (DTW), which measures the similarity between two time
series after finding an optimal match between them by warping the time axis, which, in turn, allows capturing some non-linear
variations in time series. They also found that content- and user-based features are the most useful features for early detection of
the promoted content whereas timing- and network-based features become important when more users involve after trending.
Overall, their approach showed 75% AUC score for early detection, increasing to above 95% after trending.
El-Mawass et al. (2018) introduced a hybrid approach, in which graph-based method is coupled with machine learning classifiers
in a probabilistic graphical model framework. They choose to use a graph based on the similarity between users’ applications,
rather than using the social structure of the network. They build a Markov Random Field (MRF) model on top of the resulting
similarity graph. They used supervised classifiers to calculate the initial beliefs of MRF. On the other hand, the similarity between
users is used to propagate beliefs about their labels. The graphical inference phase only alters beliefs on connected nodes, which
is efficient against social bots where the presence groups of connected spammers is common. They applied joint optimization
using Loopy Belief Propagation over the MRF to obtain the most accurate labels, which permits to correct misclassified labels
from baseline supervised classifiers. They used profile-, network-, content- and behavioral-based features. Their novel features
and approach successfully increased both precision and recall even for off-the-shelf classifiers when compared with the features
used in Benevenuto et al. (2010) and Stringhini et al. (2012). Moreover, their hybrid approach enhanced the overall accuracy
from 0.918% to 0.952% when compared to SVM alone where they used the same features for these two approaches. However, as
we mentioned above, the graphical inference phase alters beliefs only on connected nodes. Therefore, when spam nodes are
isolated from each other, the performance of this approach will be equivalent to a conventional supervised classifier.
Lee and Kim (2014) proposed a method to detect potentially malicious account groups around their creation time based on the
differences between automatically generated account names and human-made ones. An agglomerative hierarchical clustering
approach is applied to group accounts sharing relevant name-based features within a short period of time. Then, they classify
malicious account clusters using SVM classifier. Their approach achieved 1.98% FNR and 20.74% FPR. The goal here is
to notify back-end detection systems to monitor these account groups, and consequently take further action them. The main
drawback of this approach is that it depends on the characteristics of malicious account names. Therefore, attackers may design
advanced name generation techniques to evade detection. The worst case may happen when the attackers mimic the name-based
features of legitimate users.
Chavoshi et al. (2016a) proposed DeBot, a dynamic-time-warping (DTW)-based correlation approach to find bots with high
temporally correlated activities. They developed a novel lag-sensitive hashing technique to group correlated users based on
warping correlations. DTW is applied in order to compute the distance between two users. DeBot consists of the following
four stages: The first stage includes collecting tweets that contain selected keywords for a per-defined period, then it forms
the time series of activities at every second for all of the user-accounts and filters out users with just one activity. These series
are processed by taking the activity time series of all the users as input and hashes each of them into multiple hash buckets to
detect correlated activity patterns between two or multiple users by reporting sets of suspicious users that collide at the same
hash buckets. The third stage includes monitoring the activity of suspected users via the stream API. The last step includes
single-linkage hierarchical clustering on the pairwise DTW distances calculated from suspicious time series. DeBot detects less
number of bots than BotorNot, due to the fact that BotorNot is trained based on English-language tweets, while DeBot catches
all languages just based on temporal synchronicity. The authors also claim that other approaches may not be able to detect all the
dynamics of social bots based on limited features, which results in a smaller overlapping between these different approaches.
DeBot was able to detect 544,868 unique bots through one year period. A smart attacker, however, can evade detection by
inserting unbounded random time delays among the same tweet from many accounts Chavoshi et al. (2016b).
Perna and Tagarelli (2018) introduced Learn To Rank (LTR), a supervised approach to learn a ranking model from annotated
instances to detect social bots at different severity levels. LTR learns from training data, which corresponds to multiple queries,
whose annotations are according to degree of relevance of objects to a given query. To this end, they extracted three groups of
features: (1) static (user-based, network-based, temporal-, content-based), (2) aggregate- and (3) query(keyword)-based features
where the feature extraction step was performed via Twitter API and services of BotOrNot, BotWalk and DeBot approaches. For
relevance labeling, they use three approaches: (1) binary relevant balanced (BB) selection (2) binary relevance/unbalanced (BU)
selection, and (3) balanced (Grad) selection with 7 grades of bot status. For feature selection, they used principal component
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analysis (PCA), information gain (IG) and gain ratio (GR) attribute evaluation, OneR, correlation-based feature selection (CFS),
and learner-based feature selection with J48. Content-based and aggregate features were mostly selected by the above methods.
RankNet Burges et al. (2005) ,Coordinate Ascent Metzler and Croft (2007), AdaRank Xu and Li (2007) and LambdaMART
Wu et al. (2010) as ranking models. The most successful models were Coordinate Ascent and LambdaMART under different
scenarios. The aggregate features followed by content-based features, reveal to be a more robust to all methods. Interestingly,
LambdaMART and Coordinate Ascent were able to achieve very good ranking prediction accuracy when trained on the subspace
of aggregate features, which again explains the importance of aggregate features. Under the BB setting, the methods achieved
low variance in their performance. However, under UB setting they showed a high variance. Under Grad setting, Coordinate
Ascent and LambdaMART were more robust w.r.t. the assessment criteria.
Morstatter et al. (2016b) proposed BoostOR, a method that optimizes the F1 score through boosting. Their method gives
higher weights for mislabeled bots while downweights mislabeled legitimate users. In addition, they employed latent Dirichlet
allocation (LDA) to obtain a topic representation of each user, which can be viewed as a probability distribution over k topics.
The experimental results on two real-world datasets showed that their method achieved better results over SVM, AdaBoost, as
well as other common heuristics used to detect bot accounts. Table 5, provides a comparison of emerging detection approaches.
Table 5: Comparison of emerging detection approaches
Ref. Approach Features Classes Camp.Detection
Feng et al.
(2017)
Hierarchical clustering Local graph (i.e. two layers ofneighbor nodes of the target-node)
Spam or normal
account 7
Cresci et al.
(2018a)
Digital DNA-based
approach. Behavior-based features. Bot or not. X
Clark et al.
(2016)
Natural language approach
Average pairwise tweet dis-
similarity. Word introduction
rate decay parameter. Average
number of URLs per tweet.
Robots, cyborgs
& human spammers. 7
Varol et al.
(2017b)
k-NN with dynamic
time warping
Network structure and information
diffusion patterns, content and language,
sentiment, timing, and user meta-data
Organic and promoted
trends. X
El-Mawass
et al. (2018)
MRF with initiated
beliefs using SVM
Profile, network, content and
behavioral features
Verified users (cyborg),
human users, trend
hijackers, promotional
spambots.
7
Lee and Kim
(2014)
Clustering & classifying
malicious groups. Account name-based features.
Legitimate or
malicious clusters. X
Morstatter
et al. (2016b)
BoostOR A topic representation of each userbased on LDA. Bot or not 7
Chavoshi et al.
(2016a)
Single-linkage
hierarchical clustering
DTW distances calculated
from suspicious time series. Bot or not X
Perna and
Tagarelli
(2018)
RankNet, Coordinate
Ascent, AdaRank
and LambdaMART.
Three groups of features: (1) static
(user-based,network-based, temporal,
content-based),(2) aggregate and
(3) query(keyword)-based features.
Ranking bots 7
5 Datasets and Findings
The lack of public ground-truth data is considered to be the main challenge that hinders appropriate evaluation of social bot
detection approaches. Comparing detection approaches is subjected to many factors such as dataset size, the number of features
considered, the ground-truth quality, data crawling process, the type of method adopted Adewole et al. (2017). Honey-profiles
can also be used for attracting malicious social bots and identifying their different activities and behaviours. Researchers mainly
create fake accounts and record the interactions with these accounts. Since these accounts are fake and generally inactive, it is
assumed that these interactions can only come from malicious accounts Echeverría et al. (2018). Honey profiles can be designed
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to look legitimate, while other honeypot profiles may explicitly indicate that they are not real. They may also attract fake profiles
by means of paid campaigns De Cristofaro et al. (2014). Honeypot datasets were used widely in different studies Stringhini
et al. (2010); Lee et al. (2011b); Subrahmanian et al. (2016); Davis et al. (2016); Echeverría et al. (2018). Tables (6,7,8) provide
a summary of datasets and corresponding findings of the previously studied methods. It is worth mentioning that we did not
include details related to datasets used in graph-based approaches as they already were provided in Ramalingam and Chinnaiah
(2018).
Table 6: Comparison of datasets used in machine learning-based detection approaches
and their related findings
Ref. Honeypot Dataset Findings
Wang 7 Collected from Jan. 3 to Jan 24, 2010.Totally 25,847 users & around 500K tweets.
Naive Bayes achieved the best results:
precision, recall & F-measure of 0.917.
Chu et al. 7 Collected 500,000 Twitter users withmore than 40 million tweets. Average TPR of 96%.
Stringhini et al. X
300 honey profiles were created, 100 for
each social network. Collected from
June, 2009 to June, 2010. Total 4250
friend requests and 85,569 messages.
Facebook: 4.51% FR. - M-5.35%.
MySpace: 36.3% FR. - M-0%
Twitter: 90.93% FR. - M-86.4%
Lee et al. X 60 honey profiles. Total of 36,000 spammers.Collected from 30 Dec,2009 to 2 Aug, 2010.
Boosting of Random Forest achieved
the best results (Accuracy of 98.62%).
Tavares and
Faisal
7
Collected dataset contains 244
acounts with total 164975 tweets.
Accuracy of 84.6% when classifying personal and
managed accounts. 75.8% when classifying
personal, managed and bot accounts.
Yang et al. 7
Two different datasets. The first dataset
consists of 20K benign account, selected
from our crawled 500. The second
dataset includes 35K Twitter accounts
randomly selected 3,500 accounts from
a dataset that contains a total of 500K
accounts, 2060 of which were bots.
RF achieved false positive rate of 0.4%,
detection rate of 84.8% and F1-score of 90%
Oentaryo et al. 7
Generated by users in Singapore & collected
from 1 Jan. to 30 Apr. 2014. It includes
a total of 159,724 accounts with 589 bots.
LR and SVM showed the best results.
Fazil and Abu-
laish
7
They used 1KS-10KN, a dataset that
contains 11000 labeled users
(10K benign users & 1K spammers)
with total of 1354618 tweets.
Outperformed Yang et al. (2013).
RF achieved the best results in
terms of DR, FPR, and F-Score.
Davis et al.;
Varol et al.
X A dataset of 15K manually verified bots and16k account with more than 5.6M tweets. 0.95 AUC (Area Under ROC Curve).
Echeverría et al. X
A botnet dataset that contains aggregated
content generated from a variety of bot
datasets and a second legitmate user
dataset. The final aggregated bot
dataset contains over 1.5M bots
with all their available tweets.
Light Gradient Boosting Machine (LGBM)
achieved an accuracy of 97%.
Beg˘enilmis¸ and
Uskudarli
7
Analysis of over 200 million tweets which
were mainly posted during the 2016 US
presidential election. The model is trained
using a training data set with 851 records.
RF showed high scores with full features, with
an average accuracy and f-score greater than
0.95, while LR and SVM showed better results
when PCA is applied.
Continued on next page
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Table 6 – continued from previous page
Ref. Honeypot Dataset Findings
Fernquist et al. 7
They used three datasets for training their
model. The first one was crawled during Oct.
and Nov. 2015 and contains 647 bots and
1367 genuine accounts. The second dataset
consists of 591 bots and 1,680 genuine
accounts. The third dataset is manually
annotated and consists of 519 human
accounts and 355 bot accounts. The test
dataset consists of 991 social spam bots
and 991 genuine accounts.
Their model achieved the best results when
compared to other supervised models. However,
an unsupervised approach Cresci et al. (2016)
outperformed their model in terms of accuracy,
precision and F1-score. They achieved
the highest recall among all other models.
Al-Qurishi et al.
(2018a)
7
Two large datasets included 25,510 and 2200
manually annotated honest and sybil accounts,
along with 13,957 and 940 profiles’ accounts.
They were generated from posts related to
the USA Election 2016.
An accuracy of 86% when fed with noisy data.
Al-Qurishi et al.
(2018b)
7
609M tweets from nearly 364K individual
Twitter accounts, as well as 51K YouTube
users with 13M channel activities.
In terms of F-measure, RF and iterative regression
achieved 96%. J48 achieved 94%. Regression
and SVM achieved 95% and 84% respectively.
Dickerson et al. 7
Indian Election Dataset (IEDS) collected
from July 15, 2013 to March 24 2014.
It contains 7.7M tweets by over 555K users.
AUC of 0.73.
Ahmed and Abu-
laish
7
Facebook dataset contains 320 profiles,
165 spam and 155 normal user profiles.
Twitter dataset contains 305 profiles,
160 spam and 145 normal user profiles.
The results obtained on a combined dataset
has DR as 0.957 and FPR as 0.048,
whereas on Facebook dataset the DR and
FPR values are 0.964 and 0.089 respectively
and on Twitter dataset the DR and FPR
values are 0.976 and 0.075 respectively.
Gao et al. 7
This study contains two datasets: Facebook
data is the same as their previous study.
Twitter set contains over 17M tweets related
to trending topics that were generated
between Jun. 1 and Jul. 21, 2011.
TPR of 80.9% and FPR of 0.19%.
Miller et al. 7
The dataset for this study included 3239
user accounts with a sample tweet from
each account. 208 spam accounts and 3031
randomly selected verified normal users.
StreamKM++ achieved 99% recall and a 6.4%
FPR;and DenStream produced 99% recall and
a 2.8% FPR. When combined together, these
algorithms reached 100% recall and a 2.2% FPR.
Minnich et al. 7 A dataset that contains 362K nodeswith 226M edges
Detected 7,995 previously undiscovered bots
from a sample of 15 seed bots with a
precision of 90%
Chen and Subra-
manian
7
A white-list of popular and trustworthy
URLs that includes nine most widely
used Twitter URL shortening services,
collected 50,000 tweets from each service.
They collect most recent 200 tweets
from every account in each group.
Bots account for 10% to 50% of tweets
generated from 7 URL shortening services.
They also found that bots using shortened
URLs are connected to large-scale spam
campaigns that control thousands of domains.
Table 7: Comparison of datasets used in coordinated attacks approaches and their related
findings
Ref. Honeypot Dataset Findings
Fields (2018) 7 Several datasets that containedapproximately 933.222 tweets
Detected 14,585 bots. Under 11,000
of these were unique accounts.
Beutel et al.
(2013)
7
Facebook dataset contains 3.3 billion Likes
and synthetic data that consists of a bipartite
graph between 38 million and 10 million
nodes with 410 million edges
Fast detection with high accuracy
and low false positive rate.
Continued on next page
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Table 7 – continued from previous page
Ref. Honeypot Dataset Findings
Giatsoglou et al.
(2015)
7 12M retweets to posts of 298 active Twitter users 97% accuracy and 0.82 F1-score.
Jiang et al. (2014) 7
Three sets of synthetic data that contains
approximately 1M, 2M, or 3M nodes. In addition
to two real world datasets: 1) Twitter dataset
that contains 41,652,230 nodes with 1,468,365,182
edges from Titter (July 2009), and 2) Weibo
dataset which contains 117,288,075 node with
3,134,074,580 edges (Jan 2011).
Achieved better accuracy by 36% on
Twitter and 20% on Tencent Weibo, as
well as in speed when compared with
Perez et al. (2011)
Cao et al. (2014) 7 One-month execution logat Facebook in August 2013
Achieved more than 99% precision. Finds
malicious activities that were undetectable
by previous approaches, unveiled 1156 large
campaigns and more than two million
malicious accounts.
Jiang et al.
(2016b)
7
Actor-movie IMDb dataset, US patent
citation network with 3,774,768 vertices
& 16,518,947 edges, & a synthetic dataset.
Outperforms the existing methods with
99–100% detection.
Zhao et al. (2018) 7
Synthetic dataset with 2K sources and 2K targets.
In addition to product review dataset from
Amazon(2015) with 4,552 users & 6,347 products
99% accuracy and 99.8% F1 score
Mesnards and Za-
man (2018)
7
Twitter data from six different events
1- Pizzagate (Nov-Dec 2016) which
contains 1025911 tweets - 176822 users
2- BLM 2015 (Jan-Dec 2015) which
contains 477344 tweets - 242164 users
3- US election (Sep-Oct 2016) which
contains 2435886 tweets - 995918 users
4- Macron leaks (May 2017) which
contains 570295 tweets - 150848 users
5- Hungary election (Apr 2018) which
contains 504170 tweets - 198433 users
6- BLM 2016 (Sep 2016) which
contains 1274596 tweets 545937 users.
Approximately 10% of the accounts
were labeled as bots.
Outperformed BotOrNot Davis et al.
in terms of AUC, runtime
and false positive rate.
Gupta et al. (2019) 7
Three datesets related to different political
events: 1- UK General Election (2017)
with 1,459,205 reweets & 443,913 users
2- Indian banknote demonetization (2016)
with 2,015,101 retweets & 288,487 users
3- Delhi Legislative Assembly Election (2013)
with 6,800,687 tweets and 297,793 users.
82.88% accuracy and an AUC of 0.921
using Random Forest classifier.
Benigni et al.
(2019)
7
Includes 3 datasets. The first one has 106K users
and 268 million tweets. The 2nd one has 92,706
users and 212 million tweets. The 3rd dataset
has 87,046 users and 179 million tweets.
Multiple sub-communities of bots
or cyborgs within each dataset.
Yan (2013) 7
Collected between Jun. 31 and
Sep. 24 in 2009. It contains
41,652,230 user profiles and
1,838,934,111 tweets.
The main advantages is small number of
monitored nodes except when every bot is
node. The main disadvantage is that it
requires a clean core without malicious
bots to function effectively and it has
an offline component.
Continued on next page
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Table 7 – continued from previous page
Ref. Honeypot Dataset Findings
Gao et al. (2010) 7
Facebook dataset contains 187M
posts generated by roughly 3.5M
users in between Jan. of 2008 and
Jun. of 2009.
TPR of 96.1% and 93.9% for malicious URLs
and posts respectively. FPR of 3.9% & 6.1%
for benign URLs and wall posts respectively.
They found 200,000 malicious wall posts with
embedded URLs, obtained from more than
57,000 malicious accounts, of which 97%
found to be compromised accounts.
Lee et al. (2011a) 7
It contains two datasets. The first
dataset contains 1912 tweets. The
second one contains ∼1.5M posts
between 1 and 7 Oct. 2010.
For the first (small) dataset the cohesive and
strict approaches outperformed the loose
and cluster-based approaches. For the other
(large) dataset cohesive campaign detection
approach outperformed the strict campaign
detection by combining multiple related
cliques into a single campaign. The largest
campaign contains 560 vertices and
it is a spam campaign.
Table 8: Comparison of datasets used in emerging detection approaches and their related
findings
Ref. Honeypot Dataset Findings
Feng et al. (2017) 7
Sina Weibo dataset, collected in Jan. 2015
consists of 246,898 accounts, 224,481 normal
accounts and 22,417 spam accounts.
A detection rate of 86:27% with a false
positive rate of 8:54%. It also outperformed
PageRank and SybilDefender.
Cresci et al. (2018a) 7
It included the following datasets: the first one
included 991 spambots with 1610176 tweets
related to Mayoral election in Rome, in 2014.
The other one included 464 spambots with
1418626 tweets try to advertise a subset of
products on sale on Amazon. The last one
is a human dataset, which included 3474
account with 8377522 tweets.
Outperformed Yang et al.,
Ahmed and Abulaish (2013) and
Miller et al. (2014).
Clark et al. (2016) X
1% sample of Twitter’s streaming API containing
geospatial metadata between Apr - Jul 2014
and it includes the most active 1000 users.
It also included another set of accounts
collected from social honeypot experiment.
Precision, recall & F-measure of 0.917.
Varol et al. (2017b) 7
The promoted trend dataset was collected
between 1 Jan and 31 Apr 2013 with 2385
tweets and 2090 unique user. The organic
dataset was collected between 1-15 Mar 2013
with 3692 tweets and 2828 unique users.
An AUC of 75% for early detection,
which also increased above 95%
after trending.
El-Mawass et al.
(2018)
7
Collected between 5 and 21 Oct 2017.
It contains a random sample of 20M
tweets from 12M active users.
Enhanced the overall accuracy from
0.918 to 0.952 when compared to SVM.
Lee and Kim (2014) 7
It consists of 4,687,345 Twitter accounts
created between April 2011 and October
2011 among 18,289 of them were verified
Twitter accounts.
Achieved 1.98% FNR and 20.74% FPR.
Morstatter et al.
(2016b)
X
It contains two datasets. The first one is related to
Arab Spring in Libya and was collected
between 3rd Feb, 2011 to 21st Feb, 2013.
It contains 94535 unique users, 7.5% of them
are bots. The second one is arabic honeypot
dataset in which, they collected 6285 unique,
accounts 3602 of them were active bots.
Outperformed SVM, AdaBoost
as well as other common heuristics
used to detect bot accounts.
Continued on next page
27
The Art of Social Bots: A Review and a Refined Taxonomy
Table 8 – continued from previous page
Ref. Honeypot Dataset Findings
Chavoshi et al.
(2016a)
7
The results were relatively supported
by OSNs (Twitter) and other approaches.
Achieved 94% precision and detected
544,868 unique bots through one
year period.
Perna and Tagarelli
(2018)
X
A total of about 19K accounts,
11K of which correspond to bots
and the remaining are non-bot accounts
from datasets used in Cresci et al.
Gilani et al.; Morstatter et al.
and Varol et al..
The most successful models were
Coordinate Ascent and LambdaMART.
Under the BB setting the methods showed
low variance in their performance but
under UB setting they had high variance.
For Grad setting, Coordinate Ascent and
LambdaMART were more robust
w.r.t. the assessment criteria.
6 Conclusion
This study reviewed the state of the art of malicious social bots in terms of their stealthy behavior and detection approaches. We
meticulously investigated three main network-based detection approaches namely, machine learning, graph-based and emerging
approaches. As a result, we proposed a refined taxonomy that can be leveraged by OSN administrators and researchers to
improve the current defence strategies against malicious social bots. In addition, datasets used and their corresponding findings
were studied in detail.
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